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It will be an enormous social task to bring to life the
dream of Gideon v. Wainwright-the dream of a vast, di-
verse country in which every man charged with crime will be
capably defended, no matter what his economic circumstanc-
es, and in which the lawyer representing him will do so
proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the
support needed to make an adequate defense.'
[I]t may be that what many in our society want Gideon to
stand for is an illusion that there is equal access, that there
is equal justice, when they are unwilling to pay the price to
ensure that it actually occurs.2
We may still refer to the noble ideal that every defendant
stands equal before the law, but in fact we have reconciled
ourselves to standing short of achieving it.3
I. INTRODUCTION: IGNORING THE TRUMPET CALL
A. The Unappreciated Magnitude of Strickland's Harm
In Gideon's Trumpet, his acclaimed book about the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright,' Anthony Lewis wrote: "The Supreme Court had
sounded a trumpet. The response had to come from society."5 Lewis was
reflecting on a remark by Justice Stewart, made before Gideon was decided,
that even if appointment of counsel was mandated in every case, the Su-
preme Court could not, nor should it, make sure that indigent criminal de-
fendants were provided with "truly adequate representation."6 The distinc-
tion between the presence of an attorney and "truly adequate representation"
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 205 (1964) (emphasis added).
2 Nicholas Katzenbach, Justice-A Reality or an Illusion, 10 PACE L. REV. 415,
416 (1990).
' Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Gideon v. Wainwright: A Lesson in the Obvious, 10 PACE
L. REV. 419, 425 (1990).
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires states to provide counsel, at public ex-
pense if necessary, to individuals facing serious criminal charges). The right has been
extended to encompass criminal prosecutions involving loss of liberty for any period of
time, but not to those crimes with lesser penalties. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
5 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 193.
6 Potter Stewart, Right to Counsel, 18 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 91, 93 (1960).
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is the subject of this Article.
A quarter century after Gideon, Lewis joined many others in concluding
that the trumpet had at least been muted.7 Today, the condition of an
individual's right to counsel is even worse than has been previously recog-
nized. Not only has the Supreme Court abandoned Lewis' vision of the
promise of Gideon; but the Court has become a negative force, ensuring that
the trumpet call will not be heeded.
In 1984, Strickland v. Washington8 effectively discarded Gideon's noble
trumpet call to justice in favor of a weak tin horn. Directly contrary to its
rhetoric in Strickland,9 the Court has effectively ensured that Gideon guar-
antees little more than the presence of a person with a law license alongside
the accused during trial. This weakening of the guarantee certainly has prov-
en to be true regarding the component of the right to counsel purporting to
guarantee minimally adequate performance by criminal defense counsel.
This Article analyzes the means by which the United States Supreme
Court has undermined, if not virtually destroyed, the right of indigent ac-
cused to have counsel do the kind of things on the accused's behalf that an
attorney should reasonably be expected to do. The Article pays particular
attention to the impact of the Court's action in capital cases, partly because
of the importance of these cases, and partly because the worst jurisprudence
is often more plainly illustrated there.
An important component of understanding and analyzing the Court's
"right to counsel" jurisprudence is to recognize the way the Court has ma-
nipulated framing the constitutional issues and procedural doctrines that are
critical to such claims' outcomes. The Court has effectively carved up the
A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at A31; see also Richard Klein,
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986) (arguing that
underfinding of agencies that provide defense counsel to the indigent severly under-
mines the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel).
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). It is obvious from the title of this Article that the doctrine,
holding, and implications of Strickland will be examined at length. At this point, it is
sufficient to remember only the basic holding: a defendant alleging ineffective assis-
tance of counsel must bear the burden of proving (1) that the performance of counsel
was so deficient that she was not functioning as the "counsel" envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment, and (2) that this deficient performance deprived defendant of a trial whose
result was reliable. Id. at 687. These two requirements are commonly referred to as the
"performance" and "prejudice" prongs of the Strickland "test." The same day, the Court
decided United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Three years later came Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987). Cronic and Burger are particularly illustrative of the de-
structive effects of the Strickland doctrine on the rule of law. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 173-232.
9 "That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the ac-
cused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 685.
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right to counsel and placed it in pigeonholes. Whether Strickland applies,
which is often critical to the success or failure of a claim, depends on the
pigeonhole in which a claim is placed. The principal pigeonholes are:
1. Whether the accused was denied the presence of an attor-
ney? °
2. Whether counsel was "actually ineffective"?"
3. Whether counsel was denied the ability to perform, for
example, because of late appointment? 2
4. Whether the state directly interfered with counsel's func-
tioning?
13
5. Whether counsel had multiple client conflicts of inter-
est?
14
If there is any rhyme or reason at all to the Court's analysis and pigeonhol-
ing of right to counsel claims, it is that an analytical framework that is more
generous to prisoners developed gradually in inverse relation to the frequen-
cy with which a particular type of claim arose.
Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for fostering toler-
ance of abysmal lawyering. This criticism is particularly strong in cases, like
that of David Leroy Washington, the petitioner in Strickland, in which an
indigent defendant faces the death penalty. 5 While further reporting of the
Gideon, as explained and qualified by Argersinger and Scott, provides this guar-
antee. See supra note 4.
This situation is governed directly by Strickland.
12 See, e.g., Cronic, 466 U.S. at 648; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
'3 See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853 (1975). But cf. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
'" See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
" See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) [hereinafter
Bright, Counsel for the Poor] (examining the pervasiveness of inadequate counsel in
captial cases); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on
BehaIf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo.
L. REV. 849, 857-62 (1992) [hereinafter Bright, In Defense of Life] (providing chilling
examples of inadequate representation in capital cases); Stephen B. Bright, Death by
Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate
Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679 (1990) [hereinafter
Bright, Death by Lottery] (explaining that Strickland, in combination with the Supreme
Court's procedural default cases, has fostered a substandard level of representation for
the poor, and arbitrary and inequitable results in the infliction of the death penalty). In-
deed, editing to moderate length the section of this Article illustrating what Strickland
has fostered in the courtroom, particularly to those facing death, was a difficult task.
See infra text accompanying notes 315-412.
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abysmal lawyering betrayal of Gideon is important, it is not the principal
purpose of this Article. The Article seeks to illuminate the pernicious effects
of Strickland on recognized doctrines that were once thought to be essential
to fairness in criminal cases, and on the legal profession itself to the extent
that there is any hope that its standards of professional responsibility might
be meaningful in criminal law. The sheer weight and diversity of the harm
wrought by Strickland has not been fully appreciated in commentary. A de-
cade after Strickland's tin horn sounded across the land, a more comprehen-
sive damage assessment should be undertaken.
Strickland stands figuratively charged in a four-count indictment. Many
lesser instances of wrongdoing will also be part of the evidence in Section
II of this Article, which seeks to demonstrate that the Strickland Court has:
COUNT 1: Purposely manipulated the doctrine of harmless
error in order to protect ineffective lawyering, while at the
same time denying that the doctrine is relevant to the issue at
all.'6
COUNT 2: "Deincorporated" the most fundamental criminal
law provision of the Bill of Rights, leaving the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel open to general Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis, thereby greatly facilitating
the denial of relief to criminal defendants who have been
badly served by members of the legal profession. 7
COUNT 3: Fostered the continuation of criminal defense
performance that is often characterized not only by general
laziness, deceit, and incompetence, but also by abandonment
of clients to their accusers. 8
COUNT 4: Enlisted the norms and professional responsibili-
ty standards of the legal profession in support of the doctrin-
al offenses alleged in Counts 1 and 2, while simultaneously
denigrating the importance of those standards, thereby pro-
viding disincentives to upgrade them."
B. Reviving the Right to Counsel
If the charges are true, the state of the right to counsel today calls for
academics and practitioners to consider not only reform proposals, but also
more radical responses. Toward this reform goal, Section III of this Article
16 See infra text accompanying notes 233-61.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 262-314.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 315-412.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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presents recommendations and options that, while not specifically recom-
mended, are worthy of consideration. A campaign to secure the overruling
of Strickland and replace it with a doctrine that can make the right to coun-
sel meaningful is recommended. A new approach to codes and rules of pro-
fessional responsibility is recommended. Also recommended, for consider-
ation by competent criminal defense attorneys, is the option of non-partici-
pation--of refusing appointments. This final recommendation is undoubtedly
controversial. It may be time, however, for competent counsel to pause and
consider whether their participation impedes justice by lending the appear-
ance of legitimacy to an unjust institution. Particularly in capital cases, com-
petent defense is the exception, not the rule.
In capital cases, the decision of competent defense attorneys not to par-
ticipate would be an intensely personal one. No one should presume to dic-
tate the correct decision. Non-participation, however, is a legitimate issue.
Professor Charles Ogletree, also an experienced and capable public defend-
er, might not endorse such a choice, but he has stated that fully implement-
ing Gideon will require judges, even prosecutors, to intervene when a defen-
dant is not being properly represented,2" and on some occasions may re-
quire a defense attorney to say: "I can no longer tolerate being part of this
system of injustice that requires me to represent a client in a superficial and
ineffective way and to have my name and my reputation attached to a mis-
carriage of justice."'"
Professor Ogletree's sentiments suggest that tolerance of poor defense
by members of the legal profession, and denial of essential resources22 are
20 Charles Ogletree, Gideon v. Wainwright's Application in the Courts Today: Assis-
tance of Counsel-Is it Effective?, 10 PACE L. REv. 387, 400 (1990).
21 Id.
22 Strickland, and its companion case Cronic, held that counsel was constitutionally
required to do no more than provide meaningful "adversarial testing" of the case against
the accused. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). The important issues of the imbalance of resources
in a criminal case and availability of resources to the defense in that testing process
were not discussed. The following year, however, the Court held that a criminal trial is
fundamentally unfair if the state fails to provide an indigent accused with access to "the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (holding that where insanity is at issue, it is error not to make psy-
chiatric expert available to the defense). Unfortunately, Ake's mandate is triggered only
when a defendant makes a very particularized and substantial pretrial showing that there
can be no fair trial without the requested expert. Cases denying relief for failure to
make such a showing are numerous. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985) (stating that a motion for investigator, fingerprint, and ballistics experts must be
supported by more than "undeveloped assertions"); Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946
(11 th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (finding an insufficient showing of role of requested psychi-
atric expert in relation to behavior of defendant), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988);
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (finding that motion for inde-
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also relevant to the issue. Strickland is not directly responsible for the un-
dermining of the right to counsel, but its doctrine has played a part. The
degree of Strickland's damage to the rule of law, expressed in doctrines
carefully developed over years, the quantity of unjust, even fatal, conse-
quences fostered in individual cases, and the disservice done to the very
essence of the relationship between attorney and client, combine to issue
their own trumpet call for response. We do no honor to an honorable profes-
sion if we ignore that call.
II. THE DESTRUCTIVE LEGACY OF STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON23
A. Background: Presence v. Performance
To appreciate the denigration of the right to counsel accomplished by
Strickland, it is instructive to examine the old and familiar right to counsel
cases with a new eye. The hypothetical indictment of Strickland provides a
useful guide. What did these landmark prior cases indicate about the differ-
ence between the right to the presence of counsel and the right to effective
assistance of counsel? How were the constitutional claims characterized and
evaluated?
1. Powell to Gideon
a. Is Powell in the Right Pigeonhole?
Constitutional inquiry of the right to counsel usually begins with Powell
v. Alabama,24 the famous "Scottsboro Boys" capital rape cases. Powell
could have been put in the "actual ineffectiveness" pigeonhole had
Strickland been decided when Powell arose. Had Strickland been already
decided, appellants in Powell probably would have lost.
pendent forensic experts was insufficient as to type of expert and roles they would
play), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
Perhaps more importantly, the Court ignored the relationship between
Strickland and Ake. Strickland did not discuss resources. Ake did not discuss what law-
yers do or fail to do to secure resources and what use is made or not made of them if
they are provided.
A very few states, in capital cases, mandate the provision of adequate resources to
the defense by rule or statute. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13 § 2(B)(10) (stating that
appointment of counsel is to be accompanied by provision of investigators, social ser-
vice workers, mental health professionals, forensic experts, and other support services
reasonably necessary for presentation of an adequate defense at every stage of the pro-
ceedings).
23 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
24 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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Powell was the first instance in which the United States Supreme Court
reversed a state conviction because of unfair trial procedures.25 The case
was a consolidated appeal of seven young black out-of-state defendants who
had been tried and sentenced to death within two weeks of the alleged rape
of a white woman.26
In the important search for guidance on the distinction between presence
of counsel and performance of counsel, Powell is somewhat ambiguous.
Powell is commonly viewed as a case in which capital defendants were de-
nied the "effective appointment" of counsel at trial for either or both of two
related reasons. First, the issue in Powell might be seen as an outright denial
of counsel-a failure to appoint an attorney with responsibility for the fate
of the clients. The trial court appointed the entire local bar to represent de-
fendants at arraignment and to "continue to help them" if no counsel of re-
cord appeared at trial." Whether there was ever formal appointment of
counsel of record is unclear. A murky colloquy with the trial judge reveals
that a Mr. Roddy from Chattanooga, Tennessee, not licensed in Alabama,
declined to appear formally but wanted to "stay in" and not be ruled out of
the case.2" The colloquy further reveals that one Milo Moody, of the local
bar, was apparently willing to be counsel of record if Mr. Roddy was not
appointed.29 Mr. Parks of the local bar, however, was apparently not happy
about any obligation being placed on the bar as a whole.3" Properly observ-
ing that what is everybody's duty is in fact nobody's duty, the Supreme
Court stated that a proper appointment had not been made."
Powell, however, is not a simple denial of counsel case and would not
be viewed by the Court as such if it arose today. The Court in Powell made
clear that its concern about the amorphous nature of the formal appointment
was grounded in the belief that defendants did not have the actual assistance
of counsel during the brief period between arraignment and trial. 2 Further,
the language of the issue on certiorari, to which the Court confined itself,
2 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 108. There was an earlier case from Arkansas similar to
Powell arising from a massive community uproar at the time of trial. In the Arkansas
case, the Court did not reverse directly but did provide defendants with access to the
federal courts. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
26 Powell, 287 U.S. at 49-50. The case involved nine original defendants. Id. at 74
(Butler, J., dissenting). On the State's motion, four separate trials were conducted. Id.
(Butler, J., dissenting). At the time of the opinion, two of the nine original defendants
had gained relief in the Alabama court system. Id. (Butler, J., dissenting). Each trial that
resulted in a conviction, however, did not last more than a day. Id. at 50.
27 Id. at 47.
28 Id. at 54.
29 Id.
30 Id.
"' Id. at 56.
32 Id. at 57.
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was whether the accused were "denied the right of counsel, with the accus-
tomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial."33
Finally, the holding of the case strongly suggests that the appointment of
counsel was "ineffective" largely because of direct state interference with
the ability of counsel to perform as the Constitution required. The Court
stated that the duty to appoint counsel "is not discharged by an assignment
at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of ef-
fective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."34
If, however, Powell is to be seen as a species of direct state interference
with counsel's function because of late appointment, then the performance
of counsel cannot be overlooked. Today, performance review is dispositive
of the late appointment right to counsel claim. The modem Court has re-
fused to recognize as a per se violation of the right to counsel the brevity of
any period available for trial preparation, or even to hold that defendants are
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue.35 Instead, the Court has in-
sisted that claims based on late appointment and impairment of preparation
must be judged by evaluating the attorney's performance, as well as the na-
ture and strength of the prosecution's case, under the Strickland standard.36
If the actual performance of counsel had been relevant in Powell, as it
would be today, then the seldom-cited dissenting opinion of Justice Butler in
Powell," and the opinions of the Alabama Supreme Court in Patterson v.
Alabama,38 Powell v. Alabama,39 and Weems v. Alabama," are most in-
3 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 71.
" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970).
31 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); see also infra text accompanying
notes 173-89. It is ironic that Justice Stevens in Cronic cited and described Powell at
length as the paradigm of a case in which the circumstances of the appointment of
counsel and the rush to trial were so presumptively in violation of the right to counsel
that "the likelihood that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary was so
remote as to have made the trial inherently unfair." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660-61. The
statement is ironic because Cronic earlier defined the right of the accused to counsel as
no more than the right "to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 656. As will be demonstrated, the attorneys who
appeared for the Scottsboro Boys, however ambiguous their formal status, probably pro-
vided the testing required by today's standards. See infra text accompanying notes 315-
412. In any event, Cronic demonstrates that actual performance of counsel, not dis-
cussed by the Powell majority, is today the critical issue in late appointment cases.
31 Powell, 287 U.S. at 73 (Butler, J., dissenting).
" 141 So. 195 (Ala.) (affirming conviction and death sentence), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
31 141 So. 201 (Ala.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Consolidated with the appeal of
Ozie Powell were the appeals of William Roberson, Andy Wright, Olen Montgomery,
and Eugene Williams. Id. at 203. All convictions and death sentences were affirmed,
except that of Williams, whose case was reversed and remanded with instructions to
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structive. These opinions strongly suggest that any claim that the representa-
tion actually afforded by Mssrs. Roddy and Moody was constitutionally
insufficient would fail the Strickland tests.
The above argument is not to suggest that the defense in Powell was a
model of competence. Many of the acts and omissions of counsel were at
best questionable. The most significant error may have been the failure to
request a continuance.' Such a failure, however, has yet to sustain a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.42 Counsel in Powell also failed to pre-
serve some issues for appeal, but these failures were relatively unimportant
in light of Alabama's plain error rule.43 In contrast, the Strickland doctrine
permits counsel to default a literally life-saving issue in a capital case with-
out being deemed ineffective.' It should also be noted that a dissenting
determine if he was amenable to retrial as an adult, or was a juvenile under sixteen
years of age. Id. at 213.
40 141 So. 215 (Ala.) (affirming convictions and death sentences), rev'd, 287 U.S.
45 (1932). The appeal of Charlie Weems was consolidated with that of Clarence Norris.
Id. at 216.
"J Powell, 287 U.S. at 48 (argument of the Alabama Attorney General). The Ala-
bama Attorney General further noted, correctly, that capable counsel had conferred with
the defendants prior to trial. Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama confirmed that at least
Mr. Moody had enjoyed a "long and successful experience in the trial of criminal as
well as civil cases." Powell, 141 So. at 213. Thus, there was at least circumstantial evi-
dence that counsel would have recognized the need for a continuance had it existed.
Further, there is no record of the information imparted to counsel at their meetings with
defendants. Strickland makes this circumstance quite relevant: "[W]hen a defendant has
given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or
even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be chal-
lenged as unreasonable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
Modem standards thus cast doubt on a major underpinning of Powell's holding:
Neither [defense counsel] nor the court could say what a prompt and thoroughgo-
ing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investi-
gate. No opportunity to do so was given .... Under the circumstances disclosed,
we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial
sense.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 58.
42 Nor is it likely to. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940), defense counsel
did request a continuance to avoid trial three days after they were appointed. Id. at 447-
48. Noting the fine performance of the attorneys at trial, the Court found no constitu-
tional error in denial of the request. Id. at 453. Avery is cited with approval in Cronic,
466 U.S. at 661.
" See, e.g., Powell, 141 So. at 204 (no timely challenge to sufficiency of indictment
at trial, but court ruled on the issue). The court also ruled on the merits of the defaulted
claim that blacks were systematically excluded from venire. Id. at 210.
44 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (holding that under Strickland there was no
ineffective assistance and that the federal courts properly refused to hear petitioner's
meritorious claim of error because his counsel defaulted the claim under Virginia law
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justice of the Alabama Supreme Court considered the defense to have been
more pro forma than zealous, in large part because counsel waived closing
argument.45
However, it is assessment of those things that counsel did in defense of
their clients that leads to more than a suspicion that the convictions and sen-
tences in Powell would not be set aside based on the right to counsel issue
if the cases arose today, provided that the evaluation was confined to evi-
dence appearing in the record. 6 The dissenting opinion of Justice Butler
and the opinions of the Alabama Supreme Court indicate that defense coun-
sel:
1. Conducted a successful defense of one of the defendants
at trial-Roy Wright was not convicted.47
by failure to raise the claim on direct appeal, even though the claim was raised at trial).
The Court in Smith accepted the trial ounsel's assertion that he had chosen not to in-
clude the federal Fifth Amendment claim because it was unlikely to succeed in the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court. Id. at 531-32. The Court later characterized the winnowing of
weaker claims and focusing on those more likely to prevail as "the hallmark of effec-
tive appellate advocacy." Id. at 536. Whatever the truth of this statement in non-capital
cases, it is the worst advice any attorney could be given in death penalty litigation.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, characterized Smith's claim of error as unquestionably
meritorious. Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting). No part of the majority opinion ques-
tioned Justice Stevens' assertion. Michael Smith was executed on July 31, 1986. Execu-
tion Update, Death Row, U.S.A. (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund) 693
(Fall 1994) [hereinafter Execution Update]. The Court decided Smith in the context of
habeas corpus proceedings. The same rule would apply on certiorari, however, with the
Court declining to decide claims not properly presented to and decided by the state
courts. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814 (1992).
"' Powell, 141 So. at 214 (Anderson, C.J., dissenting).
46 The "record," where effective assistance at trial is at issue, refers to the record
compiled by trial counsel themselves and supplemented or challenged only with further
evidence and submissions from different defense counsel in state or federal collateral
proceedings. It should be remembered, however, that there are severe limitations on pre-
sentation of new facts for the first time at federal habeas proceedings, see Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992), and that any failure of habeas counsel to con-
duct a proper investigation, develop an issue, or otherwise render competent represen-
tation is not redressable at all under the Sixth Amendment. There being no right to
counsel in collateral proceedings, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
41 Powell, 287 U.S. at 74 (Butler, J., dissenting); Patterson, 141 So. at 198. Wright
was also called as a witness in Patterson's trial and gave evidence favorable to
Patterson. Id.
A look beyond the record puts counsel in a less favorable light. Wright was only
thirteen years old. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH 48 (1969). He could not be tried as an adult unless waiver proceedings were
brought. Id. Roddy refused a prosecution offer for Wright to plead guilty and be sen-
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2. Conducted a rigorous cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses, particularly of the alleged victim Victoria
Price.48
3. Met and conferred with the clients prior to the trial.49
4. Filed, argued, and supported with evidence a motion for
change of venue.5"
5. Made and preserved objections to particular testimony
and to allowing certain prosecution witnesses to testi-
fy.51
6. Moved for a special venire.52
7. Filed a timely motion for a new trial.53
8. Raised the ultimately successful claim that defendant Eu-
gene Williams might be a juvenile and therefore not sub-
ject to the trial court's jurisdiction.54
tenced to life in prison, but agreed to keep the defense brief. Id. In spite of the fact that
the prosecutor did not ask for the death penalty, seven jurors voted for death. Id. The
jury could not agree and a mistrial was declared. Id.
48 Powell, 287 U.S. at 75 (Butler, J., dissenting); Weems, 141 So. at 217; Powell,
141 So. at 213; Patterson, 141 So. at 197. The cross-examination was on what later
turned out to be the right theory, that Victoria Price and her companion Ruby Bates
were women of less than virtuous character and were no strangers to sexual intercourse.
CARTER, supra note 47, at 26-28, 36. The line of questioning, however, was inconsis-
tent with the defendants' claim of no intercourse, and the possibility that the women
had intercourse with several white youths, who were also on the train where the inci-
dent allegedly occurred, was not even suggested. Id. at 11-50. Again, it was only after
the Supreme Court granted relief that further investigation suggested merit in this line
of defense. Id. at 26-27, 36, 228-31.
4 Powell, 287 U.S. at 75 (Butler, J., dissenting).
o Id. (Butler, J., dissenting); Powell, 141 So. at 205; Patterson, 141 So. at 196. Wit-
ness preparation on this issue, however, was far from perfect. The National Guard had
been brought in because of the uproar over the charges, see CARTER, supra note 47, at
20-21, and one of its officers was called in support of the change of venue motion,
Powell, 141 So. at 207. His testimony was not at all helpful to the defendants, see id.;
CARTER, supra note 47, at 24, nor was the testimony of the Sheriff, see Powell, 141 So.
at 207; CARTER, supra note 47, at 23-24.
"I Weems, 141 So. at 218; Powell, 141 So. at 209. Defendants objected to permitting
Ruby Bates to testify. Weems, 141 So. at 218. Although the indictments charged only
the rape of Victoria Price, Powell, 141 So. at 204, the evidence tended also to show the
rape of Ruby Bates, Weems, 141 So. at 218.
52 Patterson, 141 So. 197.
5 Powell, 141 So. at 209. This action apparently permitted the counsel who later
took over the direct appeal to amend the motion. Id.; Powell, 287 U.S. at 76 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
" Powell, 141 So. at 212.
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Whether the performance of counsel for the Scottsboro Boys was "rea-
sonable[] under [then] prevailing professional norms" and not "outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance""5 is debatable, though it
is never debated. However, when the case is examined under Strickland's
second prong, requiring a showing by the defendant that but for counsel's
errors there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, 6 the odds against the Alabama defendants get much longer.
Strickland invites reviewing courts to skip evaluation of attorney perfor-
mance altogether and go directly to this second requirement. 7
If the minimum constitutional requirements of the right to counsel are to
be defined in large part by consideration of the strength of the evidence, as
determined only from the record, then the considerable weight of evidence
at trial against the Scottsboro Boys might today seal their fate. In addition to
direct evidence from the alleged victims, there was forensic testimony of
multiple incidents of intercourse, and of bruises and scratches on their bod-
ies. 8 Further, and most damaging, the defendants testified against one an-
other. Roy Wright identified Eugene Williams and Clarence Norris as hav-
ing a knife, and stated that he saw five other co-defendants commit the
rape. In a separate trial, Clarence Norris testified that he saw his co-de-
fendant Charlie Weems rape one of the girls.6
The finger pointing among defendants in Powell may suggest that the
proper right to counsel pigeonhole in which to place Powell is really the one
relating to multiple client conflicts of interest. There is no suggestion in the
opinions that anyone except Roddy or Moody acted for defendants at tri-
al.6 The Supreme Court has said that defendants are entitled to representa-
tion free of actual conflicts of interest.6" When, at the habeas stage, counsel
defend their multiple representation at trial, however, the scope of even this
seemingly self-apparent right is not clear.63
" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
56 Id. at 694.
" The Court in Strickland stated:
[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged defi-
ciencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's perfor-
mance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.
Id. at 697.
58 Weems, 141 So. at 218; Patterson, 141 So. at 198.
9 Patterson, 141 So. at 198-99.
o Weems, 141 So. at 220.
6' Defense counsel Roddy was apparently surprised by the testimony of Norris and
tried to repair the damage. CARTER, supra note 47, at 33-34. He did not, however, raise
the conflict of interest issue. Id.
62 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978).
63 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (accepting explanation of counsel who filed
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The point of this examination of Powell is most definitely not to suggest
that the state of Alabama has been wronged by the popular view of the
Scottsboro cases, or that the defendants received adequate representation.
Subsequent investigation by organizations, academics, lawyers, and journal-
ists refutes the picture painted in the official record.' These investigations
have revealed the climate of racial prejudice and intimidation in which the
trials were conducted.
The investigations also revealed other facts important to
Strickland analysis. The prosecutor may have made promises and threats to
some defendants to encourage them to turn on others.65 Stephen Roddy was
drunk when he got to the courthouse on the day of trial;66 he had spoken
with the defendants for no more than half an hour;67 his change of venue
motion was half-hearted and ill-prepared.6" Milo Moody was almost seven-
ty and getting forgetful.69 The law, however, has never required and does
not encourage the exhaustive investigation that revealed these facts. Judg-
ments about lawyering are confined to trial, appellate, and collateral pro-
ceeding records compiled and presented by lawyers. That the Scottsboro
defendants received a fair trial, including adequate representation and mean-
ingful state appellate review, is not the real truth. If the case arose today,
however, it might be seen as the operative legal truth if the reviewing court
chose to see the issue not as a flat denial of counsel, which it is not, or as a
case of direct interference with counsel's function, which it might not be,
but as a question of attorney performance to be evaluated from the official
record according to Strickland's standards. Stated more simply, the point is
that the possibility that the actual performance of Roddy and Moody might
be constitutionally sufficient today demonstrates graphically the magnitude
of Strickland's destructive legacy. Putting Powell in the performance pi-
geonhole of the right to counsel could well mean that we have gone back-
ward in the sixty years since Powell was decided.
b. Betts: Strickland I
Just as Powell provides background on the critical distinction between
the presence of a lawyer at trial and the effective assistance of counsel,
Betts v. Brady" provides similar assistance in understanding how constitu-
appellate brief on behalf of two co-defendants where their relative culpability was at
issue).
A thoroughly documented account of the entire history of the case is found in
CARTER, supra note 47.
65 Id. at 74.
66 Id. at 22.
67 Id. at 23.
68 Id. at 24.
69 Id. at 18.
70 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that due process does not require appointment of
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tional doctrines influence and shape the way right to counsel claims are
characterized and evaluated. To understand the doctrine of "incorporation"
as treated in Betts, how Gideon sought to overrule that treatment, and how
Strickland has revived that treatment, a final look back at Powell is helpful.
If Powell can be faulted for a certain lack of clarity in defining the exact
component of the right to counsel doctrine upon which it rested, it must also
be faulted for some degree of ambiguity in its doctrinal basis. The Court
acknowledged prior decisions which established that not every guarantee set
out in the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states as a part of the Due
Process Clause.71 From these prior decisions, however, the Court concluded
that some guarantees of the Bill of Rights could be applicable to the
states-those that were "fundamental."72 In this apparent endorsement of
"selective incorporation," the Court presaged its approach in an important
case five years later,73 as well as the ultimate outcome of the "incorpora-
tion" battle within its ranks.74 Rhetorically, the Court came close to the
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause:
The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it
cannot be denied without violating those "fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions" is obviously one of those
compelling considerations which must prevail in determining
whether it is embraced within the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, although it be specifically dealt with
counsel in every case).
" Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-68 (1932). Specifically mentioned were
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding that Fifth Amendment grand jury
indictment requirement was not applicable to states), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
not applicable to states).
72 Quoting Twining the Court stated:
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action,
because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is so, it
is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but be-
cause they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99 (citations omitted)).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding that Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy guarantee, as violated in this case, was not incorporated into Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause but that guarantees may be applicable, however, if of
such a nature as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
' See infra text accompanying notes 262-314.
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in another part of the federal Constitution.75
Powell then described the historical bedrock nature of meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard as a component of due process and declared "the guiding
hand of counsel" to be a part of it at every step of the proceedings."6 It is
important to note that this discussion is about institutional responsibility to
provide basic guarantees and about the capabilities and relationships of at-
torneys and clients. No mention is made of outcome determination, harmless
error, or the weight of evidence in a given case.
The Powell majority, however, perhaps inadvertently, opened the door
for Betts, and later Strickland, by emphasizing that the failure to make an
"effective appointment" of counsel was fundamental error because of the
particular circumstances of the case-the ignorance and illiteracy of the de-
fendants, their distance from friends and family, the atmosphere of public
hostility, and the capital charge.77 "Whether this would be so in other crim-
inal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine,"
stated the Court.7 ' The Court used a general Fourteenth Amendment due
process analytical framework, whose practical implications are quite differ-
ent from "selective incorporation."
The implicit limitation on Powell's holding defeated the claim of Smith
Betts. Betts was a farm laborer in rural Carrol County, Maryland, demon-
strably too poor to retain counsel for his defense against a charge of rob-
bery. 79 His request for appointment of counsel was denied.8" A bench trial
was conducted at which the issue was simple, as it is in most robbery cases:
identity versus alibi.8 Betts cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and
examined his own witnesses." Betts was convicted and sentenced to eight
years in prison. 3 When the case reached the Supreme Court on the right to
counsel claim, the majority upheld the denial.8 Several aspects of the opin-
ion would reappear, explicitly or implicitly, more than forty years later in
Strickland:
1. The Sixth Amendment is not incorporated into Four-
71 Powell, 287 U.S. at 67 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
76 Id. at 68-69.
7 Id. at 71.
78 id.
7' Betts, 316 U.S. at 456-57.
80 Id. at 457.
81 See id.
82 id.
83 Id. at 456-57.
84 Id. at 473.
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teenth Amendment due process.85
2. Due process is a concept "less rigid and more fluid" than
those envisaged in the particular Bill of Rights guaran-
tees. Accordingly, due process violation claims must be
evaluated on a "shock the conscience" basis in light of
the totality of circumstances in a given case.86
3. It is possible for those denied counsel to gain relief un-
der the general due process rubric, but only if they bear
the burden of establishing from the record that (a) their
performance as their own counsel was deficient because
of the complexity of the case, their limited intelligence,
or similar factors, and (b) that these factors put them at a
46 ''87
serious disadvantage.
4. Evaluation of right to counsel claims is to be conducted
retrospectively by appellate courts looking at the trial re-
cord."
Betts received negative commentary from the time it was decided. Al-
though the Supreme Court stuck with Betts for a time,89 Anthony Lewis
suggests that the avalanche of scholarly criticism may have resulted in a de
facto abandonment of Betts a decade before Gideon.90 Betts was overruled,
85 Id. at 461-62.
86 "That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light
of other considerations, fall short of such denial." Id. at 462.
87 Id. at 472-73. The majority agreed with the state court that Betts was not unfamil-
iar with criminal procedure and had been able to take care of his own interest in this
relatively simple case. Id. at 472.
88 On a record consisting of some stipulated facts and the evidence taken at trial, a
Maryland habeas court denied Betts' claim. Id. at 457. From this record, the Supreme
Court evaluated Betts' performance as his own attorney and upheld the denial. Id. at
472-73. In dissent, Justice Black pointed out the unworkability of this analysis: "Wheth-
er a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which ... denial of counsel
has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the
defendant's case was adequately presented." Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
Forty-two years later, the same point, equally valid, was made about retrospective
evaluations of the performance of counsel:
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in
which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had
been competent .... The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are ex-
acerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be miss-
ing from the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134 (1947).
9 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 117-22. The last decision upholding denial of counsel un-
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but was later exhumed and lives again in Strickland.
c. Gideon: "Your Presence is Required"
Clarence Earl Gideon, a fifty-one year old Caucasian, not violent but de-
scribed as "tossed aside by life" and a "used up man," was tried and con-
victed by a six-person all male Florida jury for the offense of breaking and
entering with intent to commit petty larceny.91 His habeas petition, seeking
relief from a five year sentence, became the vehicle for unanimously over-
ruling Betts and imposing the requirement that counsel be appointed in seri-
ous criminal cases.92
Doctrinally, the opinion of Justice Black, drawing on Powell, is a
straightforward "selective" incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to
der the Betts formula was Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950). LEWIS, supra
note 1, at 191.
Not the least of the Betts problems was inconsistency. Lewis cited, as examples,
two cases decided on the same day with opposite results. They were Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728 (1948), and Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). LEWIS, supra note
1, at 119. Gryger's claim was that the trial judge had erroneously concluded that state
law required a life sentence rather than a lesser term. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 731. The
Court found no fundamental error in the absence of counsel to correct the error. Id.
Townsend's claim was that the sentencing judge mistakenly believed that two earlier
acquittals in his record were convictions. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740. The Court held
that an attorney was required. Id. at 740-41.
Adjusting the facts of Gryger hypothetically, and focusing on the performance of
counsel rather than whether counsel was present at all, illustrates the progress of justice,
or lack of it, today. Suppose the trial judge had erroneously concluded that the law re-
quired Gryger to be sentenced to death. Suppose further that counsel had been appoint-
ed for Gryger, but counsel was so incompetent as not to know that the law at the time
had authoritatively been interpreted not to require such a sentence. Had counsel known
the law and cited it to the court, Gryger would not have been sentenced to death and no
appeal by the state of a lesser sentence would have been allowed. Finally, however,
suppose that four years later, while Gryger sought habeas relief from his death sentence,
the law changed, validating the judge's original view. Today, Gryger would be better
off if counsel had been denied and he had been left to defend himself in a capital case.
He would surely gain relief under Gideon. Once this incompetent attorney appeared,
however, on these facts Gryger would be denied relief under Strickland's second prong
as was the case in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 307-14.
" LEWIS, supra note 1, at 7, 59-60, 101.
92 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Construction of the Sixth or Four-
teenth Amendments to require appointment of counsel for indigents under any circum-
stances, though not seriously contested in the trilogy of cases discussed in this section,
was nevertheless an important step. Not disputed is an assertion by the Betts majority
that the Sixth Amendment was probably a response to English common law bans on
even retained counsel. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942). Not until an 1836 stat-
utory change in that country was counsel permitted to defend felony cases. Id.
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counsel into Fourteenth Amendment due process because of the fundamental
nature of the right. 93 Such an analysis necessarily repudiated the Betts for-
mula that, in effect, permitted a determination that denial of counsel was
harmless and placed the burden on prisoners to prove that it was not.
Practically, the saga of Clarence Gideon also tells an important story
about the performance of attorneys and the importance of investigating the
quality of that performance. At Gideon's first trial by jury, one Henry Cook
testified that he returned to Panama City after being out all night at a dance
in Apalachicola, that he saw Gideon in Ira Strickland's pool room at 5:30
a.m., that Gideon came out with a pint of wine in hand, made a phone call,
and a little later got into a taxi.94 Cook further testified that after observing
these events he went back to the pool room, saw evidence of a break-in, and
notified the police.95 Gideon made an opening statement, cross-examined
Cook and Ira Strickland, presented eight witnesses of his own, and made a
closing argument emphasizing his innocence. 96 Gideon was convicted and
sentenced to prison for five years. 97 The Supreme Court observed that
Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a
layman,98 while the trial judge went further and opined that Gideon did "as
well as most lawyers could in handling his case."9 9 If a lawyer had been
present and done what Gideon did, it is doubtful that Gideon could later
have successfully demonstrated that but for what the lawyer did not do there
was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
In modem Gideons' cases, in which incompetent counsel are appointed,
we are left to speculate on the effect competent lawyering might have had.
Because he was denied any lawyer, however, the landmark Supreme Court
9 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336-45. Justice Douglas concurred, asserting that the theory
of full incorporation was still open and that guarantees incorporated piecemeal were
nevertheless applicable to the states by the same standard that applied to the federal
government. Id. at 345-47 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Clark concurred in the re-
sult because the Court had already found counsel essential to due process in capital cas-
es and the Fourteenth Amendment contained no meaningful distinction between denials
of "life" and "liberty." Id. at 347-49 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also con-
curred but wrote that Betts was entitled to a more respectful burial. Id. at 349 (Harlan,
J., concurring). He pointed out that it was legitimate for the Court in Betts to recognize
that special circumstances had played a role in Powell, but that the test set out in Betts
for determining the presence of those circumstances was confusing, had brought the
Court into disrepute, and should be abandoned. Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). The
concurrence specifically rejected the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment as a proper
basis for the result. Id. at 349-52 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 58.
91 Id. at 60-61.
96 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 LEWIS, supra note l,'at 165.
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decision resulted in a new trial for Clarence Gideon. We are thus permitted
to compare superficial lawyering with effective assistance of counsel.
Prior to the retrial, two Miami attorneys, Tobias Simon with the ACLU,
and Irwin Block agreed to represent Gideon.' He had no confidence in
them and, ironically, was ready to represent himself again, but he was able
to secure appointment of a local attorney he preferred, W. Fred Turner.0 1
Although the judge denied him a continuance, Turner spent three days
interviewing witnesses." 2 Because of this investigation, Turner knew how
to cross-examine Henry Cook effectively. In addition to an innocent expla-
nation for Gideon's presence, Turner was able to show that it was unlikely
that Gideon was carrying any of the fruits of the larceny, and more likely
that Cook himself, looking for beer after all the stores closed in
Apalachicola, was the person who committed the crime." 3 Gideon was ac-
quitted.14
Thus, it can be seen that landmark decisions about the right to have
counsel present at trial were not and could not be free from evaluation of or
100 Id. at 224-25.
101 Id. at 236-37. If Gideon were tried today, he would find that, in spite of the rheto-
ric of Powell and Gideon about the fundamental necessity of the "guiding hand of coun-
sel," he has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975). He would also find that, with the possible exception of California,
states are not obligated to and have not elected to provide indigent defendants with
counsel of their choice. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 11.4 (2d ed. 1992).
102 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 238.
103 Id. at 236-37.
"o Id. at 239-50. Turner's representation also presents an interesting twist on conflict
of interest, but one for which the state apparently has no remedy upon an- acquittal.
Turner knew a lot about Henry Cook because he had represented Cook several times,
including once on a robbery charge. Id. at 250.
An anecdote, perhaps true but perhaps a liberty taken by the screenwriter from the
transcript of the retrial, illustrates the effectiveness of investigation and preparation by
Turner at a level plainly not required of attorneys today by either the courts or the pro-
fession. In the film version of the case, Preston Bray, the cab driver who took Gideon
from the scene was called by the prosecution. He testified that Gideon told him: "Just
remember you haven't seen me. Don't tell anybody you saw me." Anthony Lewis, The
History of Gideon v. Wainwright: A Journalist's View, 10 PACE L. REV. 384, 385
(1990). Although this is damaging, a tactical decision not to investigate this disinterest-
ed witness, or even not to cross-examine him would hardly be characterized as ineffec-
tive assistance today. But here is what followed:
Turner: "Mr. Bray, Did Gideon ever say that to you before?"
Bray: "Yes, he says it all the time."
Turner: "Mr. Bray, why do you suppose he says that?"
Bray: "I think it's woman trouble."
Turner: "I guess we know about that."
Id. at 385-86.
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speculation about counsel's performance. Gideon established the right to the
presence of an attorney, and did so through an absolute constitutional doc-
trine that admitted of no flexibility and eschewed harmless error inquiry.
How was the intertwined question of performance separated out to the detri-
ment of Gideon's promise? Answering that question begins with examining
the difference between the Court's rhetoric and its actual treatment of the
proposition that defendants have a right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel.
2. The Not-So Established Right to Effective Assistance
Given Gideon's doctrinal approach to denials of'the presence of counsel,
it would be extremely difficult for the Court to facilitate the rejection of
Sixth Amendment claims by prisoners if the right to have counsel present
was equated with the right to have counsel give effective assistance. Deter-
minations that effective assistance had been denied would, of course, be
more complex than determinations that counsel had been denied altogether.
Determining presence or absence is simpler than evaluating performance.
Nevertheless, once the constitutional breach was established, relief would
have to follow in both cases. It is only by dividing the right to counsel and
putting the components in different doctrinal and procedural pigeonholes
that the Court has been able to undermine Gideon.
That enterprise would be perhaps less surprising if, while engaged in it,
the Court had not continued to insist that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel. That is just what the Court has said, howev-
er, though the cases that say so are marvelous examples of the familiar dif-
ference between rhetoric and reality. In truth, at the time of Strickland the
right to effective assistance of counsel was far from well established. This
fact was not unimportant to the development of the unjust and unworkable
Strickland framework for judging ineffective assistance claims. Even while
giving lip service to prior rhetoric, the Court was able to pronounce its new
standards by fiat.
After asserting that mere presence of a lawyer was constitutionally in-
sufficient, the Strickland majority directly acknowledged its prior recogni-
tion that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance by coun-
sel.1"5 The only case cited for this proposition was the one most often cit-
ed-McMann v. Richardson."6 McMann, in the footnote cited in
Strickland, indeed avers that in 1970 it had long been recognized that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.1 7
A closer look at McMann reveals a different story. First, petitioner Rich-
o Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
106 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
"o Id. at 771 n.14.
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ardson lost."'8 The Court found that although his counseled guilty plea
could have been influenced by the possibly erroneous advice he received
about admissibility of his confession, counsel had performed within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.0 9 Enforce-
ment of the standard of competence, however, was wishfully assigned to
trial judges.10 As fairly and competently as trial judges have striven to
perform their other roles in the criminal justice system, it is nowhere argued
that they have in fact become the guardians of defense counsel competence.
If McMann's reality is suspect, so is its rhetoric. The footnote claiming
the long history of parity between the right to counsel and the right to com-
petent counsel cites several cases. None of them support the proposition.
The oldest case cited was Powell, which we have seen hardly deals with
assessing actual performance. The next cited case was Avery v. Ala-
bama."' The rhetoric of Avery is moving. Avery spoke of the "peculiar
sacredness" of the right to counsel."2 Avery reminded us that "[t]he
Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere
formal appointment.""' 3 The reality of Avery is less moving. Avery was
another Alabama death penalty case. Appointed defense counsel were forced
to trial three days after appointment, even though both were involved with
other trials in the interim, and even though Avery's case involved issues of
insanity and the murder/manslaughter distinction."4 Praising the actual
performance of counsel under these circumstances, a unanimous Supreme
Court denied the claim that the right to counsel had been violated." 5
The next case cited by McMann was Glasser v. United States. 116 Ironi-
cally, Glasser was a multiple-client conflict of interest case in which the
Court, though discussing some questionable trial tactics, undertook no defin-
itive assessment of counsel's performance and granted relief without consid-
ering the detrimental effect of any errors.' In effect, the Court put Glas-
'0' Id. at 774-75.
"o Id. at 770-75. There was also a preview of Strickland's framework. Richardson
was said to be bound by his guilty plea unless he could prove serious derelictions by
counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not voluntary. Id. at 774. Obviously, a peti-
tioner in Richardson's position who carried this burden would show that but for
counsel's failures the outcome would have been different. Review of outcomes is, of
course, more difficult when there has been a trial.
1 0 Id. at 771.
308 U.S. 444 (1940).
12 Id. at 447.
"3 Id. at 446.
14 Id. at 447-48.
" Id. at 450, 452-53.
116 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
17 Id. at 67.
Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel .... Irrespec-
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ser in what would be the Gideon, not the Strickland, analytical pigeonhole.
The final case cited in the McMann footnote, Reece v. Georgia,"' is
perhaps the most instructive of all, in part because of another case decided
the same day. Reece involved a simple claim by Amos Reece, another black
defendant sentenced to death for rape of a white woman."9 The claim did
not involve a complaint about the actual performance of his appointed coun-
sel. Rather, the claim alleged that counsel was precluded from acting at all
on a probably meritorious claim that negroes were excluded from the grand
jury in Cobb County. 2' Georgia law required that objections to grand jury
composition be made before an indictment was returned.' 2' Counsel for
Reece was not appointed until one day after the indictment. 22 The Su-
preme Court generously granted relief on Powell grounds, pronouncing
grandly that "[t]he effective assistance of counsel in such a case is a consti-
tutional requirement of due process which no member of the Union may
disregard."' 23
What would have been the result if counsel had been appointed in time
to object to racial exclusion on the grand jury, but had failed to do so? How
would the performance component of the right to counsel have been as-
sessed? The answer is found in Michel v. Louisiana,'24 decided the same
day as Reece. Although the grand jury challenge was plainly meritori-
ous, "'25 the Court refused to grant relief to yet another group of black pris-
oners sentenced to death for rape.'26 In response to the complaint of one
co-defendant about the failure of his counsel to make the grand jury chal-
lenge, the Court cited the attorney's fifty years of experience and general
reputation for competence, which included receipt of a plaque citing him as
an "astute and honored criminal lawyer."'27 Twenty-three years after
Powell, the Supreme Court was sounding a lot like the Alabama Supreme
tive of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing another party
may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness.
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser ... is at
once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.
Id. at 75-76.
118 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
"' Id. at 86.
120 Id. 87-88.
121 Id. at 88-89.
122 Id. at 86.
,3 Id. at 90.
124 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
121 Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
,26 Id. at 92-102.
127 Id. at 101 n.7.
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Court in Powell when it praised Milo Moody as "an able member of the
local bar of long and successful experience in the trial of criminal as well as
civil cases."' 28
Respected authorities have accepted McMann's often cited proposi-
tion.129 On the issue of minimally acceptable trial performance, however,
McMann's citation is demonstrably not true. The right to effective assistance
of counsel was not so well established at the time of Strickland. In spite of
its own rhetoric, the Court at the time of Strickland was free to write on a
blank page. Actual performance of counsel had, seldom been the issue in the
Court's most often cited cases. When it was the issue, defendants lost. 130
What has not been fully appreciated is that when the Court wrote on that
page, it attempted to write out virtually everything Gideon stood for and
reclaim everything possible of Betts.
B. Undermining the Right Through Doctrine
1. Mother Strickland, Brother Cronic, and Son Burger
Strickland announced an illogical and unworkable framework for evalu-
ating whether the performance of defense counsel had fallen below a con-
stitutionally required minimum. 3' United States v. Cronic,'32 decided the
same day as Strickland, encouraged courts to characterize right to counsel
claims as relating primarily to performance and therefore to evaluate them
under the Strickland standard.'33 Both cases encourage passive reliance by
defense counsel on investigations and "facts" developed by the government.
Burger v. Kemp' demonstrated an early example of the kind of deficient
28 Powell v. Alabama, 141 So. 201, 213 (Ala.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
129 See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 101, § 11.7 (claiming that Powell was
the first case to recognize the right to effective assistance, and that Powell and other
cases cited established that the right extended to performance). Subsequent sections go
on to examine the various pigeonholes into which the components of the right to coun-
sel have been placed. The authors make no attempt, however, to explain or justify the
critically important variations in doctrinal and procedural treatment of claims under
these components. Id. §§ 11.7(d), 11.8-.10. In fairness, however, neither did Strickland
when it simply pronounced the rules for claims of deficient performance. See infra text
accompanying notes 150-66.
30 As has been seen, the basis for Powell's holding is unclear, Glasser was a conflict
of interest case, and Reece was a clear example of the state preventing effective assis-
tance. Only Avery and McMann itself were decided as performance evaluations. In
those cases, the prisoners lost.
'1 See infra text accompanying notes 136-72.
132 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
'33 See infra text accompanying notes 173-89.
13" 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
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lawyering that would come to be commonly approved under Strickland and
Cronic.1'
It must be acknowledged that William Tunkey, appointed counsel for
David Leroy Washington, faced a difficult task. Against Tunkey's advice,
Washington had confessed and pled guilty to three brutal murders and
waived the right to a jury, electing instead to be sentenced by the trial judge
to either life in prison or death. 36 In one sense, however, Tunkey's task
was simplified. There was nothing to defend on the question of guilt or
innocence. The principal remaining value of the guiding hand of counsel at
this point in Strickland was to maximize the chance that Washington would
be sentenced to life in prison instead of death.
Motivated by what the Supreme Court would in retrospect determine
was a sense of hopelessness, and a tactical decision to limit what the prose-
cution could present, counsel did virtually nothing with respect to the sen-
tencing hearing. 37 On the issue of punishment, Tunkey conducted only the
most cursory investigation, and presented no evidence.' Tunkey relied in-
stead on an apparently favorable response by the trial judge during the plea
colloquy to Washington's acceptance of responsibility for his acts,
Washington's assertion that he had no significant prior record, and
Washington's explanation that at the time of the crimes he had been under
extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.'39 In spite of
counsel's arguments on these themes, the trial judge sentenced Washington
to death. 4 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's grant of re-
'35 See infra text accompanying notes 190-232.
136 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984). For the details of
Washington's crimes, see Washington v. Florida, 362 So. 2d 658, 660-61, 665 (Fla.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). Washington's case arose in Florida, where the
decision of a capital jury that defendant be sentenced to life in prison is a recommenda-
tion that can be, and often is, overridden by the trial judge in favor of death. See Mi-
chael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 32-33 (1985); Michael
Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1409, 1411-13 (1985). Still, Florida case law requires that the trial judge
not override a life recommendation unless facts calling for.death are so clear that virtu-
ally no reasonable persons could differ. Tedder v. Florida, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla.
1975). Waiving the right to a jury trial was probably a bad choice by Washington, a
choice which may have had at least a subconscious effect on the Court's evaluation of
his right to counsel claim under the Strickland formula. Florida juries have recommend-
ed life in some quite aggravated cases. See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Am-
sterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Pen-
alty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 18-22 (1988).
13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-74.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 675.
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lief on Washington's right to counsel claim, finding both adequate perfor-
mance by the attorney and absence of prejudice from any errors. 4 ' Wash-
ington was executed two months later.'42
The doctrinal and logical framework established by Strickland is of par-
amount importance, but that framework is influenced by the Court's decid-
edly unrealistic view of trial practice. For that reason, a brief look at the
lawyering approved by the Court in Washington's case is worthwhile. Coun-
sel apparently knew little, and presented no evidence about, Washington's
life and background.'43 For all that is known, then, Washington was physi-
cally or sexually abused as a child in a manner that bore some causal or
explanatory relationship to the crimes he committed. Whether that is true
will never be known because it was not investigated.'44 Similarly, because
conversations with Washington gave no indication of psychological prob-
lems, and because defendant had been examined by the state, the Court
excused counsel's failure to seek a psychiatric evaluation or otherwise in-
vestigate Washington's character and emotional state.'45
14' Id. at 700.
14' Execution Update, supra note 44, at 692.
"' Tunkey spoke with Washington, and by telephone with Washington's wife and
mother. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-73. He did not follow up on one effort to meet with
them. Id. He declined to request a presentence report. Id.
'" The Court has consistently held in capital cases that the sentencer may not be pre-
cluded from considering, and indeed must consider as mitigating, any aspect of the
character and background of defendant or circumstances of the offense proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). For this reason,
it is universally accepted among competent capital defense attorneys that every aspect
of a client's life, from pre-birth to trial, must be investigated. See AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES §§ 1.1, 11.4.1, 11.7.1 (1989). See generally William S. Geimer,
Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273
(1990-91); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299 (1983).
"' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673, 676-77. Aside from the common sense skepticism
with which anyone might react to the proposition that a multiple murderer and kidnap-
per had no psychological problems, the record certainly does not settle the question.
The statutory authority for the state ordered examination of Washington only extended
to inquiry into his sanity and competency to stand trial. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210 (1972)
(sanity at time of offense and at time of trial); id. 3.211 (competency to stand trial); cf.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1990) (authorizing appointment of a mental
health professional to assist defense in determining mitigating factors in capital cases).
Habeas counsel in Strickland did obtain psychiatric and psychological evaluations.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. Because the evaluations did not conclude that Washington,
as he asserted at plea colloquy, was acting under extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance, but was only "chronically frustrated and depressed," the Strickland majority
found no error. Id. at 675-76. In any event, said the Court, there was no prejudice be-
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Habeas counsel presented fourteen affidavits of individuals who would
have testified for Washington at sentencing.' The Court apparently held
the view that the impact of the self-serving statements of a murderer was
equal to the sworn testimony of fourteen people who were willing to go to
bat for him knowing what he had done. The Court held that all the evidence
alleged to have been overlooked would "barely have altered the sentencing
profile presented."' 47
Finally, at several points the Court lauded counsel for successfully mov-
ing to exclude Washington's "rap sheet," admission of which might have
undermined his contention at the plea colloquy that he had no significant
history of criminal activity. 4 The Court's opinion did not indicate wheth-
er this motion was made before another judge. It would be unusual if anoth-
er judge had heard the prior conviction exclusion motion.'49 On the other
hand, if the sentencing judge handled pretrial matters, as the opinion and
customary practice suggest, then the successful motion gained only the
dubious benefit of having the sentencer bound by law to put out of his mind
the criminal record of which he had been made aware.
Minimal as it was, the representation afforded David Washington was
far from the most deficient that would come to be approved under the stan-
dards established in Strickland. In addition to the shortcomings discussed in
the sections that follow, Strickland is characterized by ad hoc pronounce-
ments unsupported by prior law, unwarranted assumptions unsupported by
empirical data, and a marked absence of plain logic.
The Court recognized that Strickland was the first case arising in the
"actual ineffective assistance of counsel" pigeonhole. 50 The Court there-
cause the aggravating circumstances were so "overwhelming." Id. at 677; cf Maynard
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (reaffirming to trial and appellate courts that
no particular set of facts, however shocking, are enough standing alone to justify impo-
sition of the death penalty). The record does not reflect the breadth or quality of the ex-
aminations secured by habeas counsel. The counsel's performance in this respect is un-
reviewable. See supra note 46.
'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675.
147 Id. at 700.
1 8 Id. at 673, 700.
14' There is no requirement for a hearing before a different judge in the Florida rule
governing pretrial motions and defenses, derived from the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190. The grounds for disqualifying a judge are narrow,
and apparently do not contemplate division of pretrial and trial matters. Id. 3.230.
'o Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684. A useful history of lower court treatment of claims
dealing with the performance of counsel up to the time of Strickland is found in
Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983). Citations from every federal
circuit demonstrate that from the fifties until 1970, courts employed a standard that re-
quired a showing of ineffective assistance of a kind that "shock[ed] the conscience" and
made the proceedings a "farce and mockery of justice." Id. at 151. By 1970, however,
every circuit except the second had abandoned the "farce and mockery" standard and
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fore felt free, after casually equating the right to counsel with the right to
effective assistance of counsel, simply to pronounce that the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee was not to improve the quality of legal repre-
sentation, but only to ensure that a sufficient adversarial testing of the
government's case takes place to permit confidence in the outcome.'51 As
Justice Marshall observed in dissent, this cramped vision of the purpose of
the guarantee denies it the function of ensuring that even guilty persons are
convicted only through fundamentally fair procedures.'52
Having thus pronounced this limited purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee, and thereafter adopting the "reasonably competent assistance"
standard,"3 the Court pronounced the guarantee's relation to the standards
of the legal profession: "The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,'
not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies in-
stead on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify
the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary pro-
cess that the Amendment envisions."
'154
This is a remarkable statement. At the time the Sixth Amendment was
adopted, there were no formal standards of the legal profession.' The
statement that "it" (the Sixth Amendment) relies on the legal profession
surely cannot refer to any historical reliance. Neither can this invented rela-
held that defendants were entitled to "reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 151-52
(citations omitted). In adopting the latter standard, Trapnell observed that the distinction
in the wording of the two standards had been unimportant to the actual determination of
claims, but there was a perception that the "farce and mockery" standard was less de-
manding. Id. at 153. Significantly, the court also noted that, since Gideon, a threshold
level of competence was now governed by the Sixth Amendment, not just the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and a higher standard might be constitutionally required. Id. at 154-55; see
infra text accompanying notes 276-87.
' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87, 689. "The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function-
ing of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
52 Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Recently, in another context, the Court has
shown less interest in the reliability of the outcome than in whether fundamentally fair
procedures were employed at trial. In Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), after
ticking off the procedural guarantees afforded an accused at trial, including the right to
effective assistance of counsel, the Court concluded that death sentenced prisoners are
not necessarily entitled to any forum in which to litigate after-discovered evidence of
innocence. Id. at 859-61.
153 See supra note 150.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
'" See CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1 (1986) ("Law was
among the last of the professions to adopt a common code of behavior."). "When the
American Bar Association was organized in 1878, no attention was paid to ... stan-
dards to govern lawyer conduct." Id. § 2.6.2.
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tionship between the profession and the Constitution provide support for the
Court's view of the role of counsel envisioned by the Amendment.
The statement also invokes the unsupported presumption that counsel
will perform in a manner that meets the guarantee. The only authority cited
is Michel, the case of the lawyer who failed to make the meritorious objec-
tion to the grand jury's composition, but who enjoyed a good reputation in
the profession.'56 Once the norms of the profession have somehow been
enlisted to support a presumption of competence, however, they become su-
perfluous, even potentially harmful to the Court's analysis. For the purpose
of actually evaluating claims of ineffective assistance, the prevailing practice
norms of the profession are relegated to the status of mere guidelines.'57
The Court went on to announce that even prisoners who demonstrated
that the representation afforded them fell below an "objective standard of
reasonableness ' 58 were not entitled to relief unless they could also demon-
strate a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." '59 The Court did
generously announce that a capital sentencing proceeding was the equivalent
of a trial for right to counsel purposes.6
In its guidelines for implementing the new test, the Court truly left logic
and human experience behind. In judging the performance prong, whether
156 See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
117 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The Court asserted that it was impossible to set out
detailed rules constituting minimally acceptable conduct by defense counsel. Id. at 688-
89. This assertion is challenged in detail in Section III of this Article. See infra text ac-
companying notes 430-56.
58 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
'5 Id. at 694.
'6 Id. at 686-87. This is no small concession. The Constitution has traditionally been
held to require fewer safeguards in sentencing proceedings than before guilt is estab-
lished. Compare, for example, the holdings of the Court guarding the right of defen-
dants at trial to put on evidence and contest the government's case in Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), with FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(c)(3) (at sentencing defendant entitled only to comment on presentence re-
port and evidence to be relied upon in sentencing but anything further is at discretion of
trial judge). Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (prosecution must prove be-
yond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to establish guilt) with McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (fact necessary for imposition of mandatory minimum sen-
tence may be established by preponderance of the evidence).
This equating of the guilt/innocence trial and the capital penalty trial for right to
counsel purposes, however, further undermines the logic of the Court's conclusions con-
cerning the desirability and capability of an appellate court determining whether a trial
level result would have been different but for counsel's errors. Determining whether a
different result might have been reached on guilt or innocence is extremely difficult.
Determining whether a sentencer, particularly a jury, might have imposed life instead of
death is virtually impossible. See infra text accompanying note 170.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
counsel's assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the
Court decreed that judicial scrutiny is to be "highly deferential."'61 There
is to be a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct flell] within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."'62 Counsel are strongly pre-
sumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant deci-
sions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. The only support
cited for the "strong presumption" and "highly deferential scrutiny" was
Michel, along with what the Court termed the difficulties inherent in hind-
sight evaluation.'63 No empirical support was cited for the presumption of
competence. There is none."6 There was also no discussion of how an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness could be assessed with these interpretive
and procedural thumbs on the scale.
The Court's final justifications for forbidding "intrusive" post-trial inqui-
ry into performance were also a series of unsupported assumptions. The
Court opined that the proliferation of claims that would result would ad-
versely affect counsel's performance and willingness to serve, as well as
"dampen the[ir] ardor."'65 Especially in capital cases, one hopes that the
willingness to serve of attorneys who fear evaluation according to minimally
acceptable professional standards would be adversely affected. How such a
review could adversely affect their performance, however, is a mystery.
What is also disingenuous about this analysis is that the Court discussed it
against a hypothetical backdrop of "rigid requirements for acceptable assis-
tance," when it had just forbidden the practice of identifying and applying
any particular requirements at all.'66
Questionable logic and unsupported assumptions also pervaded the
Court's treatment of the "prejudice" prong of the test. One of the first ques-
tions that arises is why have the performance prong at all, when reviewing
courts have been invited to skip the prong and move right to the issue of
whether the petitioner has made the mandatory showing of prejudice.'67
Further, the unwarranted deference mandated in the performance evaluation
was continued in the discussion of prejudice. Attorney errors in a particular
case were as likely to be "utterly harmless ... as they [were] to be prejudi-
cial."'68 In addition to failing to assert empirical, scientific, or even anec-
dotal support for this statement, the Court apparently gave no consideration
to the kind of error that would have to be shown in order to meet the re-
161 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
162 Id. (emphasis added).
161 Id. at 689-90.
"6 In capital cases, anecdotal evidence would seem to indicate a reverse presumption.
See infra section III.
65 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
166 Id. at 688-90.
167 See supra note 57.
168 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added).
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quirements of the performance prong-overcoming deference, strong pre-
sumptions of competence, objectively unreasonable, etc. Surely, that type of
error is not as likely to be harmless as prejudicial. Logic would seem to
dictate that once a claimant has overcome the obstacles necessary to estab-
lish the performance prong, at the very least a circumstantial inference of
prejudice arises.
Finally, the Court's logic was also backward on the question of hind-
sight. The difficulty inherent in hindsight is said to be of such a degree that
it virtually precludes any objective evaluation of attorney performance.'69
In the application of the prejudice prong, however, these inherent difficulties
apparently disappear. The same reviewing court previously cautioned to
avoid hindsight in judging performance, for example, is deemed perfectly
capable of judging the effect of that performance on the "reasoned moral
response" of a capital sentencing jury.7' Belatedly, the legal profession
has developed generally accepted standards for criminal defense perfor-
mance. 7' While it is probably unwise simply to adopt these standards in
their present form as the performance gauge of Strickland's first prong,"'
169 "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time .... There are countless ways to provide effective as-
sistance in any given case." Id. at 689.
170 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime."). The complexity of the capital sentenc-
ing decision is further illustrated in Brown:
While the sentencer's decision to accord life to a defendant at times might be a
rational or moral one, it also may arise from the defendant's appeal to the
sentencer's sympathy or mercy, human qualities that are undeniably emotional in
nature....
This Court ... has recognized and even safeguarded the sentencer's power to
exercise its mercy to spare the defendant's life.
Id. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The very definitions of "moral," aside from coupling the word with "reasoned,"
also illustrate the virtual impossibility of second-guessing such a decision: "[B]ased up-
on inner conviction ... virtual rather than actual, immediate, or completely demonstra-
ble... sanctioned by or operating upon one's conscience or ethical judgment."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1468 (1986).
For further examination of the virtually immeasurable factors and procedures in-
volved in the life/death sentencing decision, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991).
171 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-1.1 to -8.6 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
172 This Article argues that, while the American Bar Association Standards for the
Defense Function are inappropriate as the sole measure of evaluating ineffective assis-
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they do exist. In fact, the standards are crystal clear compared to the factors
that go into a capital sentencing decision. With Some degree of difficulty,
attorney performance can be evaluated in hindsight. Prejudice from inade-
quate performance, especially as to sentencing, is not similarly amenable to
second guessing.
Cronic, the companion case to Strickland, can be fairly criticized more
for what was implicit than what was explicit in the majority opinion. A real
estate attorney was given twenty-five days to prepare a defense against mail
fraud charges arising from an alleged check-kiting scheme.' More than
nine million dollars was transferred between interstate banks in a four month
period.'74 The government had reviewed thousands of documents during its
four year investigation.'75
Given the onerous burden placed on claimants in Strickland, in which
attorney performance was at issue, the legal pigeonhole into which Cronic's
appeal of his conviction was placed would be virtually determinative of the
success of his right to counsel claim. Was this an "ineffective appointment"
case like Powell, or must Cronic satisfy the performance and prejudice
prongs of Strickland? The Tenth Circuit had granted relief, using a perfectly
logical circumstantial evidence matrix to determine whether to presume prej-
udice from the late appointment.'76 After reciting inspiring rhetoric from
Powell and Gideon,'77 the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court character-
ized the case as a Strickland performance/prejudice case, with the presump-
tions of competence and the burden of proof on the claimant.'78
tance of counsel claims, minimum performance standards for constitutional purposes are
nevertheless possible to formulate. See infra text accompanying notes 443-56.
' United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649 (1984).
174 Id.
175 Id.
' The court had examined five circumstantial categories that, depending on their
strength, would suggest a Powell approach rather than performance analysis: (1) time
afforded for preparation and investigation; (2) experience of counsel; (3) gravity of the
charge; (4) complexity of possible defenses; and (5) accessibility of witnesses to coun-
sel. Id. at 652.
117 Id. at 653.
17' The presumption of competence and allocation of the burden of proof was sup-
ported by yet another citation to Michel. Id. at 658. The Court's further discussion of
why this was a Strickland and not a Powell case simply illustrated the wisdom of the
Tenth Circuit approach. The Court set out the facts of Powell at some length as an ex-
ample of a case where the likelihood that even a competent lawyer could provide effec-
tive assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate, but also
warned, citing Avery and Chambers, that not every late appointment and refusal to grant
a continuance gives rise to such a presumption. Id. at 660-61. The Court concluded that
"only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a
Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance
at trial." Id. at 662.
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In thus pigeonholing the claim, and then denying relief for failure to
demonstrate specific errors of counsel or prejudice, the Court promoted an
unhealthy view of the proper function of defense counsel. The Court an-
nounced that Sixth Amendment relief would be granted only when the crim-
inal process "loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries."17 9
Framing the analysis in this manner suggests only that a certain type of pro-
ceeding is required, and does not address the effect of imbalances that exist
within such a proceeding.
180
Implicit in the analysis used to characterize the claim and deny relief
was the notion that the Constitution requires no more than adversarial "test-
ing" by passive, reactive defense attorneys who are free to rely on the
prosecution's investigation to produce the facts of the case they are to test.
For example, the Court found that defense counsel did not need time to ex-
amine the thousands of documents examined by the government because
many of the documents were used to show the stream of checks between
banks, a fact which was not disputed. 8' Consequently, the Court deemed
the only issue at trial to be the simple question of whether these undisputed
transactions justified an inference of intent to defraud by Cronic."' Twen-
ty-five days was deemed an adequate amount of time to deal with that is-
sue.183 Thus, Cronic was required to point to specific errors satisfying
Strickland. The case was remanded to give him an opportunity to do
that. 184
One problem with Cronic's analysis is that the issue was not quite as
This examination of surrounding circumstances was, of course, the reason for the
five-factor framework established by the Tenth Circuit. The Supreme Court did not un-
dertake to discuss why, using those perfectly relevant factors, this was a Strickland and
not a Powell case; the Court simply announced that it was. Id. at 660.
179 Id. at 656-57 (emphasis added).
180 Neither does the ambiguous citation with approval of language suggesting that a
criminal trial does not require participants of near equal skill, but must not be a "sacri-
fice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators." Id. at 657 (citing United States ex rel. Wil-
liams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)).
81 The time spent by the government in assembling, organizing, and summarizing
the two streams of checks was said to have "unquestionably simplified the work of de-
fense counsel in identifying and understanding the basic character of the defendant's
scheme." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 664.
183 Id. at 665.
8 Id. at 666-67. On remand, the Tenth Circuit again granted relief. United States v.
Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401 (10th Cir. 1988). The court pointed to specific deficiencies in
defense counsel's failure to assert an available defense and counsel's failure to investi-
gate a matter that would have produced evidence to rebut the prosecution's contention
that nothing had been paid on an overdraft. Id. at 1404. Tried and convicted again, Har-
rison Cronic won final relief from the Tenth Circuit based on failure of the
government's proof. United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990).
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simple as whether criminal inferences could be drawn from unquestionably
authentic documents. The government also made its case against Cronic
through the testimony of two co-defendants, Cummings and Merritt. The
two co-defendants had actually handled the transactions, but testified that
Cronic had conceived and directed the entire scheme. 85 A proactive de-
fense attorney conducting an independent investigation might very well have
wished to examine the thousands of documents available to the government,
including those not introduced at trial, for evidence that the characterization
of the enterprise by Cummings and Merritt was not accurate.'86 The Court
is correct, however, that the kind of defense attorney it envisions, one who
merely "tests" what the state presents, could probably ensure in twenty-five
days that the trial did not lose its "character" as a confrontation between
adversaries.
Thus, Cronic encourages characterization of claims under the most diffi-
cult test for claimants, and adopts Betts' approach that the relative simplicity
of the case is relevant to the right to counsel claim. An extreme conse-
quence of Cronic's message, that the effect of external factors on the likeli-
hood of prejudice is to be minimized and claimants are to be required to
point to specific trial errors under Strickland, is illustrated by Gardner v.
Dixon.'87 In Gardner, the Fourth Circuit denied relief to a death sentenced
prisoner who could not meet Strickland's standards, 188 even though his at-
torney was a cocaine addict and was actively abusing that substance and
other narcotics during preparation and conduct of the trial. 1
89
In Burger v. Kemp, 9 ' the Court's first major opinion applying the
Strickland test to a claim of deficient attorney performance, the justices re-
... Cronic, 466 U.S. at 651.
186 Withiout extensive elaboration, let it simply be observed here that the assurance
offered by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972), that exculpatory evidence casting doubt on the credibility of
Cummings and Merritt would be disclosed by the government is no substitute for inde-
pendent investigation.
Impeaching the credibility of Cummings and Merritt was important. Their testimo-
ny characterized themselves as mere footsoldiers in a scheme designed by Cronic.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 651. Defense counsel was able to establish on cross-examination
that they had received considerable benefit from the government in return for their testi-
mony. Brief for the United States at 4-5, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)
(No. 82-660). A complete investigation of company documents involving the three, in-
cluding but not limited to those relating to the government's allegations, might have
confirmed or cast doubt on their version of events. Such an investigation could not be
conducted in 25 days.
187 No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147 (4th Cir. October 21, 1992) (per curi-
am).
88 Id. at *34.
9 See id. at *13.
98 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
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jected the claim in a five to four decision.' 9' The Court also narrowed the
conflict of interest pigeonhole in right to counsel claims, in effect imposing
a modified Strickland test on this species of claim as well.
Christopher Burger was seventeen years old at the time of his crime.' 92
He had an IQ of eighty-two and functioned at the level of a twelve year
old.' 93 He had also suffered possible brain damage from beatings he re-
ceived when younger.' 94 Nevertheless, at the time Burger and Tom Stevens
murdered Roger Honeycutt, all three were active duty members of the U.S.
Army, stationed at Ft. Gordon, Georgia.' 95 Honeycutt, a part time cab driv-
er, was abducted by the other two and sexually assaulted by Stevens. 96
Honeycutt was then placed in the trunk of a car by Stevens.' 97 After open-
ing the trunk and asking Honeycutt if he was all right, Burger closed the
trunk and ran the car into a pond. 9 Honeycutt drowned.' 99 The evidence
at Burger's trial was consistent with the assertion that Stevens, who was
twenty years old at the time, was primarily responsible for the plan to ab-
duct Honeycutt and the decision to kill him."
Alvin Leaphart represented Burger through trial, appeal, resentencing,
and a second appeal.' Strickland was decided during the pendency of
'g' Id. at 776. Only Justice Marshall had dissented in Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even Justice Brennan, while dissenting from the judg-
ment in Strickland, endorsed the framework established by the majority for reviewing
ineffective assistance claims, expressing the belief that its standards were "sufficiently
precise" and would "provide helpful guidance" to the lower courts. Id. at 702-03
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically, Justice Brennan cited
with approval the stay just granted in Christopher Burger's case, Burger v. Zant, 466
U.S. 902 (1984) (stay of execution granted pending disposition of writ of certiorari), ob-
viously expecting that this was a case which would call for relief under the Strickland
tests. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). When that did not happen, Justice Brennan, along with Justices Blackmun and
Powell, joined Justice Marshall as dissenters. Burger, 483 U.S. at 796 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
192 Burger, 483 U.S. at 779.
193 Id.
'94 Id. at 818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 778.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 779.
19 Id.
200 Id.
20' Id. at 780. Both Burger and Stevens were awarded new sentencing trials because
the trial judge had failed to charge the jury on mitigation and had failed to make it clear
that the jury could vote for life imprisonment even if it found statutory aggravating fac-
tors. Stevens v. Georgia, 247 S.E.2d 838, 841, 843 (Ga. 1978); Burger v. Georgia, 247
S.E.2d 834, 838 (Ga. 1978). Both were resentenced to death. Stevens v. Georgia, 266
S.E.2d 194 (Ga.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Burger v. Georgia, 265 S.E.2d 796
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Burger's collateral federal appeals in which the lower federal courts af-
firmed the denial of Burger's right to counsel claims under Strickland."2
Burger's right to counsel claims included one in the "actual ineffective-
ness" pigeonhole because Leaphart presented no evidence in mitigation at
either sentencing trial, and another in the "conflict of interest" pigeonhole
because Leaphart's two person law firm represented both Stevens and Bur-
ger even though the relative culpability of the two was a significant practical
and legal issue."3 In rejecting the conflict of interest claim, the Court den-
igrated the protection afforded by an attorney's duty of loyalty. In doing so,
the Court also established a modified Strickland framework. The Court de-
clined to find a per se violation of the right to counsel in cases in which
attorneys represent clients with conflicting interests, even though the Court
recognized that the possibility of prejudice inheres in virtually every in-
stance of multiple representation. 2" Instead, the Court held that it would
"presume" prejudice, i.e. grant relief, only when defendants bore the burden
of establishing that (1) counsel "actively" represented conflicting interests,
and (2) the actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. 215 Just
(Ga.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980). Stevens was executed on June 29, 1993. Exe-
cution Update, supra note 44, at 695. Christopher Burger was executed on December 7,
1993. Id. at 696.
202 Burger, 483 U.S. at 781-82.
203 Id. at 779-83.
204 Id. at 783.
205 Id. Here, the majority engaged in subtle, but important semantic manipulation of
its precedent. The majority purported to rely on Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980). Cuyler, however, is at best ambiguous on the subject of whether the proper
question is whether an actual conflict, determined conceptually, affected performance,
or whether there was "active" representation of a conflicting interest which affected
performance. In two of the sections of Cuyler cited by the Burger majority, it would
appear that a claimant who showed that a conflict adversely affected performance
should prevail. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 350. Elsewhere, however, Cuyler refers to a
showing of "active" representation of competing interests as a constitutional predicate to
a successful claim. Id. at 350.
There is no question that Burger and Stevens had conflicting interests and that
counsel must have known of the conflict. While there was evidence that Stevens insti-
gated the killing of Honeycutt, see supra note 200, his confession blamed that circum-
stance on Burger and minimized his own role. See Stevens, 247 S.E.2d at 840. If this
established actual conflict, the next step would be to move on to the second prong and
evaluate the claim that Leaphart's advocacy was affected because he did not raise rela-
tive culpability on appeal and did not seek a plea bargain that would offer Burger's tes-
timony against Stevens, who was represented by Leaphart's partner. Burger, 483 U.S. at
783-88. The majority, however, never acknowledged that there was an actual conflict.
While giving its approval to joint representation, the majority simply moved on to con-
sidering whether what it termed a possible "overlap" in counsel adversely affected
Leaphart's performance. Id. at 783-84. Justice Blackmun was sufficiently disturbed to
take issue with the "overlap of counsel" versus "active representation" distinction, and
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as showing deficient performance does not satisfy Strickland's first prong,
demonstrating the conflict of interest does not satisfy Burger's first prong.
Claimants must demonstrate "active" representation of conflicting interests.
As Justice Blackmun acknowledged in dissent, the second Burger prong is
not as substantively onerous as its Strickland counterpart."6  Like
Strickland and Cronic, however, Burger's second prong raises formidable
procedural barriers, forcing claimants to identify and prove specific effects
causally tied to the professional shortcoming.2"7
Although Burger clearly left the "conflict of interest" pigeonhole of the
right to counsel claim a more hospitable abode than the "actual ineffective-
ness" pigeonhole, the Court's application of the conflict standard suffers
from the same Strickland ills: unwarranted and unsupported assumptions,
faulty logic, ignorance of the realities of trial practice, and indifference to
the standards of the legal profession. The majority's singularly unpersuasive
response to Burger's claim under the standards identified began with a reci-
tation that was at once irrelevant to the claim and evocative of an issue left
unsettled in Strickland:
Particularly in smaller communities where the supply of
qualified lawyers willing to accept the demanding and unre-
warding work of representing capital prisoners is extremely
limited, the defendants may actually benefit from the joint
efforts of two partners who supplement one another in their
preparation. In many cases a 'common defense ... gives
strength against a common attack.'2 8
There was, of course, no common defense and no common attack in this
his opinion demonstrated that the joint representation was as active as that which oc-
curred in Cuyler. Id. at 801, 803 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Cuyler, 446 U.S. at
338-39. Even if relief was to be denied on the "adversely affected advocacy" prong, it
would appear the legal profession had a legitimate expectation that the Burger majority
would at least recognize the representation of conflicting interests involved and con-
demn it as a matter of professional responsibility. See infra text accompanying notes
423-25.
20" Burger, 483 U.S. at 798-800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207 When the conflict of interest issue was not before the Court, the Strickland major-
ity recognized the difficulty of making such a showing in that context: "Moreover, it is
difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by con-
flicting interests." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In Burger, when the issue was before the
Court, only Justice Blackmun in dissent made the point that prejudice is difficult to as-
sess because conflicts compel an attorney to refrain from certain actions. Burger, 483
U.S. at 800 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208 Burger, 483 U.S. at 783-84 (citation omitted).
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case."9 Neither was there any indication of a benefit to Burger from the
fact that Leaphart and his partner, representing Stevens, helped each other
out. The Court's pronouncement invites reconsideration of the unanswered
question raised by Justice Marshall in Strickland: is the Sixth Amendment
standard to vary according to differences in geography and local resourc-
es? 1' Is joint representation of clients with competing interests to be
viewed with more tolerance when qualified lawyers are in short supply?
Continuing in the Strickland mold, the majority in Burger added an un-
warranted and untested assumption. The majority presumed that counsel are
aware of their overarching duty of loyalty to clients, and blessed the trial
court's general reliance on the good faith and good judgment of defense at-
torneys as necessary and appropriate.21' Just as in Strickland's presumption
of competence, the validity of the presumption of loyalty is apparently not
subject to the real world testing required by the Court for presumptions in
other contexts. 2 '
The majority also added a requirement for conflict claims that could in
some respects be more onerous than the Strickland formula for evaluating
performance deficiencies. The Court held that finding an actual conflict of
interest required a determination that Leaphart's motivation not to argue
lesser culpability stemmed from the fact that Stevens was his partner's cli-
ent.' This requirement of proof of improper purpose could be more diffi-
cult to establish than proof that a performance deficiency was not the result
of a strategic choice made based on accurate information." 4
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent, the essence of Burger's con-
flict of interest claim was that Leaphart failed to argue Burger's lesser cul-
pability on appeal when the Georgia Supreme Court was statutorily required
209 Id. at 803 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21 Burger, 483 U.S. at 784.
2 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (fact to be inferred must
be more likely than not to flow from the proven fact); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 467-68 (1943) (reason and common experience must support permissive presump-
tion of one fact from the establishment of another). The proven fact in Burger was only
that Leaphart was a generally well respected member of the legal profession acting as
defense counsel in a capital case. Burger, 483 U.S. at 780. The majority did not discuss
the question of whether this fact alone made it more likely than not that he did not rep-
resent conflicting interests to the detriment of Burger.
2' Burger, 483 U.S. at 784-85.
24 The majority went on, however, to find that relative culpability was argued at
Burger's separate trial. Id. at 786-87. The Court then repeated its deadly advice that
strategic decisions to winnow out weak claims on appeal are the "hallmark of effective
appellate advocacy." Id. at 784 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)).
The advice is deadly because of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (claims de-
faulted under state law ordinarily not subject to federal review absent showing of
"cause" and "prejudice"); supra note 44.
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to consider the issue,2"5 and that Leaphart failed to seek a non-capital plea
bargain which included an offer of Burger's testimony against Stevens." 6
As noted, the majority's response to the first claim ignored the Court's own
precedent on failure to raise issues on appeal.2"7 Its response to the second
demonstrated ignorance of trial realities." 8
Finally, in the Strickland mold, the majority denigrated the standards of
the legal profession by ignoring the standards' minimal requirements that
clients be informed of, and consent to, representation involving a conflict of
interest." 9
While many aspects of Strickland's restrictive view of the right to coun-
sel were apparent in the Burger majority's treatment of the conflict of inter-
est claim, Burger's true impact was most clearly revealed in the Court's ap-
proval of the failure to present any mitigating evidence at either sentencing
hearing. First, the Court approved Leaphart's failure to use what he knew:
Burger's family history as related by his mother.22 She could have testi-
fied that: at age fourteen she married Christopher's father, who was sixteen;
they were divorced when Christopher was nine; two succeeding stepfathers
did not want Christopher; one beat Christopher's mother in his presence,
and the other started Christopher on drugs as a child; after further beatings,
Christopher's mother and he were thrown out of the house and hitchhiked to
Tampa; on the way to Tampa, they were forced to sell Christopher's shoes
to buy food.22' In spite of this experience, Christopher's criminal record
before enlistment in the army consisted only of shoplifting and truancy.222
Leaphart was aware of some, but not all, of the family history.223 Amaz-
ingly, the majority's approval of Leaphart's failure to have Christopher's
mother testify or to fully investigate the family history rested on the fact
that she would have had to reveal Christopher's petty criminal record, and
on the conclusion of a a lower court judge, who heard her testimony, that
her testimony would not have helped!224
215 Burger, 483 US. at 804-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 807-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 See supra note 211.
218 The majority was satisfied that the claim lacked merit from evidence that
Leaphart did try to plea bargain, and from its own determination that the prosecutor did
not need the testimony of Burger because the evidence was overwhelming. Burger, 483
U.S. at 785-86. Justice Blackmun thoroughly instructed the majority concerning the
myriad of factors in addition to strength of evidence that affect the conclusion of plea
bargains in capital cases. Id. at 807 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 797 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 789-90.
221 Id. at 790; id. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222 Id. at 790.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 792.
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Next, there was the issue of what defense counsel did not know because
he did not pursue the mitigation investigation. Several potential witnesses
who could have further developed Burger's family history and impairment
were located by habeas counsel.225 Trial counsel's failure to find these wit-
nesses through investigation was excused because every component of their
testimony would not have cast Burger in a positive light.226 A former
neighbor, for example, in testifying that Christopher's father did not want to
associate with Christopher would have had to reveal that it was because
Christopher was on juvenile probation.227 His uncle would have revealed
that Christopher was involved with drugs in Florida.28
The majority's position illustrates the gross unfairness of employing the
Strickland prejudice prong in the context of a capital penalty trial, resulting
in rank speculation concerning what factors might influence a jury to vote
for life imprisonment rather than death.229 For example, would a jury, in-
formed that adults had involved Burger in drug use when he was but a
child, really consider his uncle's testimony that he used drugs in Florida to
be aggravating, or would such evidence provide a critical explanatory link
between an impairment for which he could not justly be held responsible
and the circumstances of his offense? 3°
Evaluation of claims under the Strickland prejudice prong is potentially
even more unfair when, as in both Strickland and Burger, the Court goes
beyond speculation and considers the claim in light of its own constricted
view of what is mitigating. Both defense counsel and the Court seemed to
conclude that evidence of good acts and characteristics about a defendant
define the limits of mitigation. Leaphart's own testimony confirms Justice
Powell's conclusion that defense counsel did not understand even the rele-
vance, much less the extraordinary importance, of Burger's mental and emo-
tional immaturity, character, and background that counsel failed to investi-
gate. 31 Defense counsel's ignorance on this point can be understood, but it
should not have been forgiven judicially. The Court's blindness is more puz-
zling in light of its prior express recognition of the value of just the kind of
evidence that Leaphart failed to uncover and present.232
225 Id. at 794-95.
226 Id. at 792-93.
227 Id. at 793.
228 Id.
229 See supra notes 160, 170.
230 See Geimer, supra note 144, at 286 n.55, 289.
23' Burger, 483 U.S. at 820 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 821 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1987) (holding to a societal belief that criminal acts attributable to disadvantaged back-
ground or emotional and mental problems are less culpable); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982) (maintaining the particular relevance of turbulent family history, beat-
ings, and rejection by father as mitigating evidence)).
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Perhaps for some justices who joined or concurred in Strickland the per-
nicious practical impact of the standards they were pronouncing was not
readily apparent. The multiple murders, the guilty plea before a judge in-
stead of a jury trial, and the unsettled situation on the right to counsel issue
in the circuits all may have obscured the magnitude of the Court's misstep.
Burger, however, provided a much clearer picture of the degree to which
Strickland would undermine the right to counsel.
2. Harmless Error on its Head
In spite of the Court's recent pronouncement that Strickland's applica-
tion does not involve harmless error analysis,233 the contrary is obviously
true. Strickland involves "unarticulated harmless-error, '234 and there are
two possible explanations for the Court's refusal to articulate the analysis.
First, the relative importance of the right abridged is significant in harmless
error analysis. 5 Second, even though harmless error doctrine can be, and
233 In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993), the Court conceded that the defi-
cient performance prong of Strickland had been satisfied when defense counsel failed to
recognize and assert case law in the circuit that would have protected the client from a
death sentence and barred appeal by the state. Id. at 840. Because that protective law
was reversed four years later, however, the Court found that the death-sentenced prison-
er had suffered no "prejudice" under Strickland. Id.; see supra note 90. The majority
also observed:
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, today's decision does not involve or require
a harmless error inquiry. Harmless error analysis is triggered only after the re-
viewing court discovers that an error has been committed. And under Strickland v.
Washington an error of constitutional magnitude occurs in the Sixth Amendment
context only if the defendant demonstrates (1) deficient performance and (2) prej-
udice. Our opinion does nothing more than apply the case-by-case prejudice inqui-
ry that has always been built into the Strickland test. Since we find no constitu-
tional error, we need not, and do not, consider harmlessness.
Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 842 n.2 (citation omitted).
234 Justice Powell aptly coined the term in a case where the majority refused to rec-
ognize the plain unconstitutionality of a statutory presumption given to the jury as au-
thority to convict because there was ample additional evidence indicating guilt. Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 177 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
235 In the Court's basic harmless error case, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967), the majority recognized that some rights were so essential to a fair trial that
they were not properly subject even to harmless error analysis, and cited coerced con-
fessions, the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge as examples. Id. at 23
n.8. It was, therefore, necessary for five members to resort to painfully lame rhetoric in
order recently to hold that coerced confessions are now subject to harmless error analy-
sis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). The Fulminante majority characterized
Chapman's citation of prior cases recognizing rights too fundamental for harmless error
as merely "historical reference[s] to the holdings of these cases." Id. at 308. The Court
would plainly have been more comfortable if it had not been forced to face harmless
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is, widely employed to salvage criminal convictions and death sentences
where the accused has been denied basic rights,236 the procedural and ana-
lytical rules are nevertheless burdensome for the government. If the doctrine
is applicable, the prosecution is required to bear the burden of establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional violation was harmless. 37
Given these two factors, were the Court to arrive at the common sense
recognition that Strickland's second prong is in effect a harmless error in-
quiry, Strickland's utility as a saver of convictions and death sentences
would be significantly undermined. As noted previously, the right to counsel
is almost universally viewed as the most fundamental of constitutional rights
in criminal cases, and determination of what a capital sentencing jury might
have done but for deficient representation is virtually impossible. Courts
have been inept at determining the significance a jury places on particular
evidence, even in non-capital cases in which the statutory elements of an
offense are available as a guide...38 Not surprisingly, the Court has declined
error doctrine directly.
236 See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). In Rose, the Court held that a jury
instruction erroneously shifting the burden of proof to the accused on a contested ele-
ment of the offense was subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 579-80. The error in
this case was rooted in a bedrock prior holding that the minimum requirement of due
process in criminal cases is that only the state must be required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every fact necessary to establish guilt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). The error also fit within the Court's most restrictive interpretation of Winship
regarding jury instructions. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (holding
that state law requiring defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence the affirma-
tive defense of emotional disturbance is not violative of due process). The majority also
took the occasion to opine that not just some, but most, errors of constitutional magni-
tude were nevertheless subject to harmless error analysis. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578-79.
237 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. The Court recently moved to ease that burden in a sig-
nificant class of cases. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), in addition to
classifying the error as "trial error," citing Fulminante, the Court determined that the
government would no longer be required to show harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases arising on federal habeas. Id. at 1717. Instead, the Court found sufficient
for constitutional trial errors the standard previously employed when the government
failed to follow rules or statutes: whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 1714 (citing Kotteakas v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
In a holding of more limited quantitative significance, however, the Court has held
recently that an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt requires automatic reversal
and is not subject to harmless error review. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078
(1993). The majority reasoned that with such an error there has been no jury determi-
nation of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Sixth Amendment, so that
it is logically impossible to employ a model which asks whether that guilty verdict
would have been different absent the error. Id. at 2082.
238 See, e.g., Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 129 n.196 (1988).
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to acknowledge that its Strickland rulest turn harmless error on its head. 39
The semantic shell game employed to deny the applicability of harmless
error is a conflation of the right and entitlement to a remedy.2 4' A state
may afford an indigent defendant on trial for his life the most ignorant,
incompetent, indifferent attorney ever granted a license to practice, and the
attorney can try the case and demonstrate that ignorance, incompetence, and
indifference. Nevertheless, the state has not committed any error. The Sixth
Amendment is not violated unless the prisoner can demonstrate that
counsel's deficiencies "undermined confidence in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding."24' Ironically, under the Court's formulation, defendants who suf-
fer denial of the assistance of counsel, explicitly guaranteed by text of the
Sixth Amendment,2 42 may nevertheless be found not to have suffered deni-
al of effective assistance as judicially engrafted on the text.
This Article argues that ineffective assistance of counsel claims ought at
the very least be included in the ambit of harmless error. Once a defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating harmfully deficient performance, a funda-
mental right has been violated and a conviction or death sentence should be
upheld only upon a showing by the prosecution that the denial was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 43 Comparing the mitigation evidence in Chris-
239 The destructive impact of the Strickland framework on the right to counsel is only
barely mitigated by the fact that it does not turn harmless error completely on its head.
Defendants do not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. However, it is the allocation of the burden, rath-
er than the standard, that is important. The party who bears the burden of proof of the
virtually unprovable, by any standard, can be expected to lose.
240 See supra note 233.
241 Recall that Strickland adopted this standard as enunciated in United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), dealing with entitlement to retrial when the prosecution
had withheld exculpatory evidence. Although the standard is subject to legitimate crit-
icism even in the discovery context, see, e.g., Stacy & Dayton, supra note 238, at 124-
25, the different sources of the right to counsel and the right to discovery make
Strickland's use of the standard even less defensible.
242 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
243 This is hardly an extreme position. If the right to counsel were considered a uni-
tary one and not one fragmented into pigeonholes, denial of minimally effective assis-
tance, by whatever standard might be formulated for that determination, would be no
different than denial of the right to have counsel present. Indeed, that was Justice
Marshall's position in Strickland. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711-12
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Chapman apparently held that the right to counsel was
so fundamental that denial was not even subject to harmless error review. Chapman,
386 U.S. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
The notion of automatic relief upon denial of minimally effective assistance also
appears less radical when analogized to the Court's treatment of another specific Sixth
Amendment guarantee in Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2078. The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees a right to a jury trial just as specifically as it guarantees the right to "assistance" of
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topher Burger's case244 with the mitigation evidence in James Hitchcock's
case in Hitchcock v. Dugger2 45 demonstrates the lack of principled justifi-
cation for the Strickland requirement. In Burger's case the jury did not hear
an appreciable amount of the mitigating evidence, including evidence of
mental impairment and a difficult upbringing, because Burger's appointed
counsel did not present it.246 In Hitchcock's case the jury heard, but was
instructed by the trial judge to ignore, an appreciable amount of the mitigat-
ing evidence, including evidence of mental impairment and a difficult
upbringing. 47 In both cases, the jury was precluded from considering evi-
dence that might have convinced it that a life sentence was appropriate. Bur-
ger got no relief because he could not meet the burden imposed by
Strickland. In contrast, a unanimous court mandated a new sentencing hear-
ing for Hitchcock, noting in passing that the state had made no attempt to
show that the judge's error was harmless.248
counsel. The text of the Amendment does not speak of "effective" assistance, or what
that term might mean, though it is not illogical to infer that the term "assistance" itself
assumes some degree of utility to the holder of the right. It is the judiciary that has,
albeit unsatisfactorily, determined that the Amendment guarantees "effective" assistance.
The language of the Amendment guaranteeing a right to jury trial could be seen to be
even less informative about what judicially created refinements might be necessary to
make it meaningful. Yet, a unanimous court in Sullivan held that a deficient instruction
on reasonable doubt deprived the accused of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
and that the deprivation was not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 2082. On the
other hand, the Amendment does specifically require trial by an "impartial" jury. That
component, however, may now have been "deincorporated" from the Due Process
Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 289-97.
244 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
245 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 219-30.
247 Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397-99.
248 Id. at 399. There is, of course, a semantic way around this analogy. The trial
judge's error was restricting mitigation to factors enumerated by Florida statute. This
violated the Court's prior command that sentencers "not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (first and third emphases add-
ed). In Hitchcock, the judge precluded consideration of Lockett evidence. In Burger, the
evidence was not proffered. I find the distinction unpersuasive.
It should also be noted that the Court has applied Chapman harmless error analysis
to capital sentencing. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that
exclusion of jailers' and visitor's testimony was abuse of petitioner's right to place all
relevant evidence before the sentencing jury for mitigation of punishment). However,
under the curious rubric by which the Court recently determined itself free to decide
that a lesser standard than Chapman will now be employed in collateral proceedings
although it had been applying the higher standard to that category of cases, the issue is
still open. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1712 (1993). For a discussion of the
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A colleague of mine undertook, somewhat half-heartedly, to play devil's
advocate and defend the Court's semantic evasion of harmless error doctrine
in Strickland. Analogizing to a tort case, he argued that it was not unusual
for courts to require more than a showing that a duty had been breached or
a right violated before granting relief. In fact, every civil plaintiff must show
not only that the party from whom she seeks relief has breached a duty
owed to her, but also that the breach caused her harm. Perhaps, he said, it is
not so surprising that before the courts will even recognize breach of the
duty to provide reasonably competent assistance, the petitioner must show
that the breach may have caused a harmful result in the proceedings.
There are a number of responses to this justification. First, Strickland's
framework is for appellate review, exactly analogous to that of harmless
error doctrine and not to the trial level requirements placed on a party who,
unlike the criminal defendant, voluntarily invokes the legal system. Second,
proof of injury from breach of duty is not the same as proof that outcome
might have been different. Thus, even under the tort analogy, Strickland's
prejudice requirement is at least quantitatively too onerous.249 Finally,
while undermining confidence in the outcome through deficient representa-
tion is obviously a harm, it is not and should not be determined the only
cognizable harm. There has not yet been a satisfactory response, other than
the Strickland majority's fiat, to the argument that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel serves values in addition to the value of fostering reliable
outcomes. What is the nature of the right to counsel for manifestly guilty
persons?"' When such people have been represented by attorneys who
could not or would not affirmatively advocate for them, but contented them-
selves merely with making the prosecution jump through required procedur-
al hoops, has not the "fairness, integrity or public reputation" of the pro-
ceedings been impugned?"'
difficulty inherent in applying Chapman to capital penalty trials, apart from the ineffec-
tive counsel issue, see James C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error
in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 740, 754-57 (1987).
249 It would be possible to prove injury from deficient lawyering, for example, with-
out proving likelihood of a different outcome by adopting the standard-used by the Fifth
Circuit in Strickland-requiring petitioners to show that counsel's errors resulted in "ac-
tual and substantial disadvantage to the course of the defense." Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Upon such
a showing, the court would also have permitted the state to save the sentence by show-
ing that the ineffective assistance would not have altered the outcome of the proceed-
ings under the requirements of Chapman. Id.
50 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A proceeding in which
the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the State
does not, in my opinion, constitute due process.").
21 See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985). To appreciate the profound
ethical dimensions of the constitutional debate over the role of criminal defense counsel,
compare the distinctly Strickland/Cronic view discernible in Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie
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Applying established harmless error analysis to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims upon proof of seriously deficient advocacy is a middle
ground between the automatic reversal urged by Justice Marshall in
Strickland,252 and the unjust framework established by the Strickland ma-
jority. The importance of the allocation of the burden of proof, however,
cannot be overestimated. The government would occasionally be able to
carry that burden, just as defendants are occasionally able to carry it under
Strickland.253 In practical terms, however, the burden would be heavy.
That is as it should be given the importance of the right violated, particular-
ly if the predicate proof of deficient performance required of defendants
continued to be assessed under the standard of Strickland's first prong."'
While the Strickland majority declined to discuss harmless error at all,
the Fifth Circuit did so in the case below, particularly on the critical issue of
burden of proof.255 The Fifth Circuit's reasons for declining to endorse the
procedure I now urge should be addressed. First, the court determined that
harmless error doctrine's placement of the burden on the government was
for the equitable and deterrent purpose of not permitting a party to profit
from its violation of law.256 This purpose was not implicated in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases, however, because the state did not cause the
violation.257 Consistent with the position that constitutional guarantees
serve multiple values, however, one can argue that the harmless error rule
serves not only deterrence and reliability, but represents an attempt to reach
Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 689 (1988) and Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawgyer's "Different Mis-
sion ": Reflections in the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125
(1987) with the affirmative/advocate role envisioned in John B. Mitchell, Reasonable
Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin 's Position on the
Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987).
252 See supra note 243.
253 See, e.g., Louisiana v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177 (La. 1992). Defense counsel ad-
mitted that he had conducted no investigation and made no preparation for the penalty
trial because he was confident the jury would return a verdict of no more than second
degree murder. Id. at 191. The court nevertheless had to determine, under Strickland,
that there was mitigation to be found, that there was no tactical reason for not finding
and presenting it, and that failure to present it undermined confidence in the sentence of
death. Id. at 190-92. One judge dissented on this issue. Id. at 192-93 (Marcus, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part). Thus, under one state's understanding of
Strickland, even if counsel is functionally absent, Gideon is not applicable. Rather, it is
still necessary to employ Strickland's prejudice test before determining that relief is
appropriate.
254 There are more realistic and workable standards for assessing attorney perfor-
mance. See infra text accompanying notes 323-46.
55 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1260-62.
256 Id. at 1260.
257 Id.
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a just result while protecting the substantial rights of the parties. Under this
view, it is irrelevant that the state did not cause the error.
2 58
The Fifth Circuit's argument has merit, but is incomplete. The notion
that the state does not cause the violation is highly questionable. Indigent
defendants are not entitled to counsel of their choice. Governments appoint-
ing counsel to represent indigent defendants are responsible for the selec-
tion/assignment system, minimum qualifications and training requirements,
compensation levels, ethical standards, and provision of resources to the at-
torneys appointed." 9 The government may not intend or promote particu-
lar defense counsel failings, but the concept of cause is hardly so cramped
as to relieve states from responsibility for such failings altogether, especially
if the only other place to lay the blame is upon the untrained and unsuspect-
ing defendant. Given these factors, harmless error rules are particularly
appropriate. Recognizing that the government does not directly cause partic-
ular errors, the government should be given the opportunity to salvage con-
victions and sentences gained as a result of such failings. Recognizing,
however, that the competence of counsel is generally in the hands of the
government, the opportunity to salvage should be a limited one.
Second, the Fifth Circuit panel envisioned an unfair situation to the gov-
ernment: if the complaint was based on defense counsel's failure to develop
and present a certain line of evidence, the government would have to prove
that failure to produce the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
even though the evidence was more readily accessible to petitioner.26 The
court's concern ignores the fact that, in order to establish deficient perfor-
mance, habeas defense counsel have to find and present evidence which the
trial counsel should have found and presented. The other half of the equa-
tion, of course, is assessment of the persuasive weight of evidence available
to and presented by the prosecution. Little inequity can be found here, espe-
cially given the courts' habit of generously crediting the prosecution's side
of the equation."'There is no practical, logical, or constitutional justification for the
28 This point, and the essence of several others urged in this Article, are thoughtfully
explored by a commentator whose name, ironically, is consistent with the trumpet/horn
metaphor employed in writings on the right to counsel. See Richard L. Gabriel, Com-
ment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emas-
culating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259
(1986).
259 For a comprehensive catalog of failures of the states and federal government in
these areas, see Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Com-
pelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993).
26 Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1261.
261 E.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699-700. ("[T]he aggravating circumstances were
utterly overwhelming .... Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no rea-
sonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion.").
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Court's anachronistic exception to the reach of harmless error analysis.
Whatever the Court's motivation, it stands as a serious example of doctrinal
undermining of the right to counsel.
3. "Deincorporation" of a Fundamental Right
The Court's recent tendency to devalue the settled resolution of its his-
toric debate over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights guarantees into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also significantly
undermined the right to counsel. 62 The Court has subtley but inexorably
moved toward assessing specific constitutional claims in the general "totality
of the circumstances," "shock the conscience," "fundamental fairness" mode
of analysis which is characteristic of the pre-incorporation cases.263
The Court's shift has the practical significance of allowing a greater
number of right to counsel claims to be rejected. This development implicit-
ly rejects the principle that appellants whose claims spring from specific
guarantees found in the text of the Bill of Rights, previously determined by
the Court to be "fundamental," are entitled to a more charitable analytical
framework than appellants whose claims are that the amorphous boundaries
of due process were crossed in their case, rendering the proceeding "funda-
mentally unfair." Acceptance or rejection of this principle makes the resolu-
tion of the incorporation debate either a meaningful factor in the lives of
criminal litigants or merely an interesting historical and academic controver-
262 The idea that all the protections of the Bill of Rights were, and were intended to
be, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment was advanced most vig-
orously by Justice Hugo Black and opposed with like fervor by Justice Felix Frankfurt-
er. See JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK AND FELIX FRANKFURTER
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 171-79 (1989). The historical premise that
the post-civil war drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended incorporation is re-
jected in Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). A thoroughly researched and well argued view
that incorporation was intended is found in MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). Whatever
the truth of the drafters' intent, it is generally accepted that a doctrine of "selective in-
corporation" prevailed, making applicable to the states those Bill of Rights provisions
deemed "fundamental" by the Court. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 101,
§§ 2.1-.6 (examining the extension of guarantees in the Consitution to state proceed-
ings).
263 For the flavor of this "fundamental fairness" analysis, see, e.g., the paradigm cas-
es of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (administering emetic to protesting
suspect, forcing him to regurgitate suspected narcotics capsules, "shocks the conscience"
and violates Due Process Clause rather than Fifth Amendment guarantee against com-
pulsory self-incrimination), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (same ratio-
nale used to grant relief where confessions extracted from black suspects through tor-
ture).
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sy.
The current Court's lack of attention to the analytical division that
should flow from the incorporation doctrine is illustrated by its specific en-
listment of Strickland's prejudice prong to perform double duty: once in ap-
plication of the specifically guaranteed right to counsel,264 and once in ap-
plication of the specifically not guaranteed general due process right to
disclosure of exculpatory evidence.265
Contrary to the Court's apparent position, the incorporation issue is sig-
nificant. Analysis of claims that specific fundamental rights were breached
should focus on whether the claimant received tlat which the Constitution
promises. If not, a presumption of relief should arise.266 Under this analy-
sis, it is irrelevant whether other rights may have been honored or whether,
in retrospect, the proceeding did not shock the conscience or was not funda-
mentally unfair in its entirety.267 In contrast, a claim grounded only in the
Due Process Clause, by its nature, invites consideration of the entire pro-
ceeding.
This section will not rehearse every aspect of the incorporation debate,
though many are relevant to the Court's actions today. 68 Rather, the sec-
tion will focus on the language of both old and recent opinions to demon-
strate that gains made by appellants as a result of "selective incorporation"
are being rolled back.
Well before Powell, the Court acknowledged the possibility that some
Bill of Rights guarantees were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.269 The earliest cases accepting incorpo-
ration dealt with the First Amendment and provided much of the language
that would later be used to sort out the criminal law guarantees.27 A key
264 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
263 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Strickland prejudice standard
adopted for all categories of claims that evidence was improperly withheld).
266 The only way to salvage the conviction or death sentence, in some but not all in-
stances, would be by a governmental showing that the constitutional error was harmless.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-61.
267 "Respondent's sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 700.
268 For a discussion of the notion that due process guarantees must encompass more
than those set out in the Bill of Rights, and the question of the applicability of federal
standards in the states' administration of the incorporated rights, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 101, §§ 2.3, 2.6.
269 "[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, be-
cause a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law." Twining v. New Jer-
sey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
270 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 366 (1937) (freedom of assembly
incorporated as part "of the essence" of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech and press incor-
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point in incorporating the Bill of Rights' criminal guarantees was Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut.27" ' Justice Cardozo rejected the
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy
because that protection could not be said to be "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," nor to be "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered lib-
erty." '272 Thus, violating double jeopardy was not to violate a "principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. 273
In spite of the First Amendment developments that helped shape the lan-
guage of the criminal law incorporation debate, the Court was reluctant for a
time to incorporate Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees. Prison-
ers were left with the fundamental fairness and totality of circumstances
mode of analysis epitomized by Betts v. Brady.274 Success in persuading
the Court to speak of the issue in Palko terms, directing attention to the
nature of the right claimed, represented an important interim victory.
Ultimately, the Court did begin to incorporate criminal law guaran-
tees-those deemed sufficiently "fundamental. '275 Beyond the issue of in-
corporation itself, the Court acknowledged after some time that the applica-
tion of incorporated rights was to be analyzed more favorably to the
claimant after incorporation occurred. This acknowledgement was revealed
in the Court's post-Palko treatment of double jeopardy issues.
porated, on assumption that they were fundamental "personal rights and liberties").
271 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
272 Id. at 325.
273 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 219 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
274 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
[A] key element of the fundamental fairness doctrine was its focus on the factual
setting of the individual case. Where a defendant contended that a state had de-
nied him due process by failing to recognize a right that would have been protect-
ed by the Bill of Rights, the issue presented was not whether that right was...
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Rather, it was whether the state's ac-
tion had resulted in a denial of fundamental fairness in the context of the partic-
ular case.
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 101, § 2.4(a), This is, of course, the Strickland, not the
Gideon, approach.
275 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment Compulsory
Process Clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment
speedy trial guarantee); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment guarantee
against compulsory self-incrimination); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment). All of the cases discussed the fundamental
nature of the incorporated right, and decreed that there be no difference between federal
and state standards for its application.
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Benton v. Maryland276 overruled Palko and incorporated the Double
Jeopardy Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Benton held that the Clause "represents a fundamental ideal in our constitu-
tional heritage."277 Prior to Benton, double jeopardy questions that arose in
state prosecutions were decided under general Fourteenth Amendment due
process analysis. For example, in Hoag v. New Jersey278 the Court denied
relief to an appellant who had been acquitted of robbing three people but
was later tried and convicted of robbing a fourth person during the same
occurrence.279 Observing that the question was always one of "fundamental
fairness," the Court declined to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment always
forbids prosecuting different offenses at separate trials when the offenses
arose from the same occurrence.' Significantly, the Court also declined to
rule on Hoag's claim that collateral estoppel on the issue of his identity as
one of the robbers precluded the second trial, holding that it must defer to
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court against Hoag on the is-
sue.
281
A year after Benton incorporated double jeopardy protection, however,
the Court heard a case virtually identical to Hoag and looked at the issues
quite differently. In Ashe v. Swenson,82 petitioner had been acquitted of
robbing one of six poker players.283 Petitioner was later tried and convict-
ed of robbing another of the players.284 The Court reversed the conviction
and held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was integral to the now-
incorporated Double Jeopardy Clause.285 The Court decided on the merits
of the claim that the state was indeed estopped from bringing Ashe to trial a
second time.286 Observing that a sympathetic lower federal court had nev-
ertheless considered itself bound by Hoag, Justice Stewart wrote:
The doctrine of Benton ... puts the issues in the present
276 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected Palko's
"fundamental fairness" test, observing that once a Bill of Rights provision was found to
be sufficiently fundamental to the American scheme of justice, it was applicable to the
states by the same standard as in the federal courts, and that the Court had been looking
increasingly to the Bill of Rights to determine whether a state criminal trial was con-
ducted with due process of law. Id. at 794-95.
277 Id. at 794..
278 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
279 Id. at 466.
280 Id. at 467.
28 Id. at 471.
282 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
283 Id. at 439.
284 Id. at 440.
285 Id. at 445.
286 Id.
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case in a perspective quite different from that in which the
issues were perceived in Hoag .... The question is no lon-
.ger whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due pro-
cess, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guar-
antee against double jeopardy. And if collateral estoppel is
embodied in that guarantee, then its applicability in a partic-
ular case is no longer a matter to be left for state court deter-
mination within the broad bounds of "fundamental fairness,"
but a matter of constitutional fact we must decide through an
examination of the entire record." 7
Thus, "incorporation" appeared to be more than a judicial determination
about the bedrock nature of a Bill of Rights guarantee. The initial decision
to incorporate also prompted a different mode of analysis. It would be fair
to say that "deincorporation" would involve reverting to fundamental fair-
ness analysis, as well as otherwise treating a guarantee as if it had not been
incorporated. That is what the present Court has done often, including
Strickland's treatment of the most fundamental guarantee of all.
Other examples of the trend toward "deincorporation" exist. A particu-
larly illustrative example of the Court's internal divisions and inconsisten-
cies involves incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
The right to trial by jury was incorporated in Duncan v. Louisiana.288
However, in two recent cases dealing with the same issue-what is required
281 Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
288 391 U.S. 145 (1968). An interesting and quite ironic sidelight, given what
Strickland did to Gideon, can be found in the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in
Duncan. Justice Fortas, of course, was chief counsel for Clarence Gideon. What he
wrote in the concurrence, however, provides at least partial underpinning for
"deincorporation." Justice Fortas agreed that the right to a jury trial was fundamental
and should be incorporated, but could not agree that "the tail must go with the hide."
Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring). He denied that, even as to an incorporated right, the
Court was "bound slavishly to follow not only the Sixth Amendment but all of its bag
and baggage, however securely or insecurely affixed they may be by law and precedent
to federal proceedings." Id. (Fortas, J., concurring).
Later, in spite of holdings in virtually every incorporation case that the guarantee at
issue was to be enforced against states according to the same standards that apply to
federal encroachment, see, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the approach of
Justice Fortas would be influential in decisions by the Court that the incorporated right
did not require states to empanel twelve jurors, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970), or require unanimity in verdicts, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). The
Court has again, however, employed an analytical framework more favorable to claim-
ants when deciding a double jeopardy issue. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978)
(holding that the rule on when jeopardy attaches is constitutionally mandated to be
uniform and that the federal rules govern).
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in state prosecutions to make the right to trial by jury meaningful-the Ashe
mode of analysis was plainly absent.
Mu'Min v. Virginia,"' and Morgan v. Illinois,"' were capital cases
in which defendants claimed that voir dire had been constitutionally insuffi-
cient to insure the right to an impartial jury. In Mu 'Min, the Court rejected
the claim that defendants must be permitted to question prospective jurors
about the content of prejudicial pretrial publicity to which they had been ex-
posed.29 In Morgan, the Court agreed that state trial courts must permit
prospective jurors to be interrogated on whether they would invariably im-
pose the death penalty if defendant were convicted.292
The language of the various opinions in these cases makes it difficult to
determine whether the claims were intentionally analyzed by the majority of
justices as if Duncan had not been decided. A purely semantic question
makes that determination difficult: is there any significance to the fact that a
reference was made only to "Due Process" rather than a specific Bill of
Rights provision in instances where "Due Process" has already been held to
include the provision? Perhaps not. But if, as I have argued, the distinction
is important in framing the analysis, the cases illustrate at least indifference
to the question.
In Mu 'Min, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the majority was
rejecting petitioner's contention that "his Sixth Amendment right to an im-
partial jury and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment"
had been violated.293 That, however, is the last mention of the Sixth
Amendment in the opinion. All other references are only to the Fourteenth
Amendment, including: "For the reasons previously stated, we hold that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach this
far." '294 Further, the rationale of the majority was based on overall fairness
of the jury selection proceeding,295 and contained familiar pre-incorpora-
tion phrases such as "the trial court's failure to ask these questions must
render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair." '296
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, and the dissents of
289 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
290 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
291 Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 431-32.
292 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232.
293 Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 417.
294 Id. at 431.
295 Id. at 431-32. The overall fairness of jury selection was not, incidentally, an
uncontroversial finding. Justice Kennedy might well have joined the majority, but he
could not abide by the fact that, under the procedure employed by the trial judge, jurors
who had acknowledged exposure to massive pretrial publicity nevertheless were permit-
ted to affirm their impartiality by merely remaining silent when asked if any of them
could not be impartial. Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 425-26.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Justices Marshall and Kennedy analyzed the claim on the narrower Sixth
Amendment question of whether the judge could properly credit a prospec-
tive juror's assertion of impartiality, thereby sufficiently guaranteeing an im-
partial jury. Reaching opposite conclusions, O'Connor and Marshall never-
theless specifically refered to the Sixth Amendment.297 Kennedy did not
refer to the constitutional provision involved, but discussed it in the same
way as Marshall and O'Connor.298 The general due process approach, ap-
parent in Rehnquist's opinion, asked whether the jury selection process was
fundamentally fair, thereby assuring that a constitutionally qualified jury was
seated. The Sixth Amendment approach, apparent in the opinions of
O'Connor, Marshall, and Kennedy, asked the narrower question of whether
the trial court could reliably guarantee that Mu'Min's Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury had been honored without knowing of the pretrial
publicity to which prospective jurors had been exposed. The analytical dif-
ference is subtle, but may well have been important in this five to four
decision.
Morgan made it even clearer that there is an analytical difference be-
tween "general due process required" and "due process required because of
incorporation." '299 The trial court in Morgan, although questioning prospec-
tive jurors generally about whether they would follow the law, refused to
allow questions about whether they would automatically vote for death if
Morgan was convicted."0 The Court reversed.3 ' Justice White, for a six
member majority, wrote the section of the opinion that discussed the consti-
tutional basis for the decision. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right and the Fourteenth Amendment right were different,3 2 but impartiali-
ty had been held to be a necessary component of both guarantees.3 3 The
297 "I cannot conclude, however, that 'content' questions are so indispensable that it
violates the Sixth Amendment. . . ." Id. at 433 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Today's
decision turns a critical constitutional guarantee-the Sixth Amendment's right to an
impartial jury-into a hollow formality." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
298 "I fail to see how the trial court could evaluate the credibility of the individuals
seated on this jury." Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
299 Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228-29.
300 Id. at 2226.
30! Id. at 2229-30.
302 Id. at 2235-36. "[O]ur decisions ... have relied on the strictures dictated by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to ensure the impartiality of any jury that will under-
take capital sentencing." Id. at 2229 (citations omitted).
303 Id. at 2228-29. This discussion was probably prompted by Justice Scalia's dissent,
which also emphasized the source of the right. According to Justice Scalia, the majority
had conceded that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to capital sentencing proceed-
ings. Id. at 2235 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (The majority did not explicitly make that con-
cession.) Therefore, there being no Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, there was
no right to a trial by an impartial jury. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Citing Mu 'Min, Jus-
tice Scalia went on to complain that the majority had reached the wrong result under
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majority then grounded its ruling in favor of Morgan squarely in general
due process.3"
I have discussed Morgan because its language specifically acknowledges
the different analytical approaches I detect. Though Morgan may be seen as
contrary to my position that general due process deincorporation makes
claims easier to reject, I do not agree. First, it is difficult to see how Mor-
gan should have lost under either analytical framework. The Court had long
ago held that jurors whose views prevented or substantially impaired their
ability to impose the death penalty could be identified through voir dire and
excluded on that basis. 5 All Morgan sought was the reciprocal right to
turn the coin over-surely a matter of "fundamental fairness" in the eyes of
most, Sixth Amendment or not. Second, in spite of, or because of, the ap-
parent merits of the claim, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas, found it necessary to drive the question out of the Sixth
Amendment's reach and characterize the issue as a general due process mat-
ter in order to justify denying relief.3"6 The three members of the Court
most committed to denying claims of criminal appellants apparently saw the
advantage of deincorporation.
It is the prejudice prong of Strickland, of course, that effectively
deincorporates the most fundamental right and deprives defendants of the
effective assistance of counsel unless the trial in retrospect can be seen as
"fundamentally unfair." This development is starkly illustrated by Lockhart
v. Fretwell.°7 In Fretwell, the Court determined that even counsel's errors
that satisfy the deferential performance prong of Strickland, and but for
which the outcome of the proceeding would surely have been different, do
not constitute a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the Court
can determine somehow that the entire proceeding was neither unreliable nor
unfair."'
Simply put, Bobby Ray Fretwell's attorney failed to bring to the trial
court's attention a then-controlling case that invalidated the only factor on
which Fretwell's death sentence was based.30 9 Had the case been cited,
fundamental fairness analysis. Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" "Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any
prospective juror who maintains such views." Id. at 2229-30.
305 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
" That characterization permitted the dissenters to enlist the maxims of deference to
state judges, and the "manifest error" standard of review, Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2239
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1961)), which
would not be available upon direct review of a specific federal question, id. at 2235-42
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
307 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993); see supra note 86.
308 Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 842-43.
" The only aggravating factor found by Fretwell's jury was that the murder was
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Fretwell would have been sentenced to life without parole and the state of
Arkansas would have had no appeal.3"' The case was not cited. Four years
later, while Fretwell was appealing his sentence, the case was overruled."'
In spite of the fact that Fretwell had met the stringent requirements of both
prongs of Strickland, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's grant of relief
on Fretwell's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and ordered reinstate-
ment of his death sentence."a2 The Court could do so only by treating the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as if it had never been incorporated:
Our decisions have emphasized that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel exists "in order to protect the funda-
mental right to a fair trial." Thus, "the right to the effective
committed for pecuniary gain. Id. at 841. He was death-eligible in the first instance be-
cause the murder took place during a robbery. Id. At the time, an Eighth Circuit case,
Collins v. Lockhart, 771 F.2d 1580 (8th Cir. 1985), had held that a death sentence was
unconstitutional if based on an aggravating factor that duplicated an element of the un-
derlying felony. Id. at 1582.
30 Surprisingly, given its practical importance, this point is not discussed. Bullington
v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), forbade, on double jeopardy grounds, a second at-
tempt to secure a death sentence where a jury, in an adversarial trial on aggravating and
mitigating factors, had once imposed a life sentence. Id. at 446. In Fretwell, the jury
imposed a death sentence after an adversarial proceeding that resulted in the finding of
an impermissible aggravating factor. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 841. Thus, accepting
Bullington's holding that a capital penalty trial is the substantial equivalent of a non-
capital trial, a more closely analogous situation might be found in the Court's pro-
nouncements concerning the double jeopardy consequences of judicial dismissals. In
double jeopardy dismissal cases, the Court has held that dismissals bar retrial if they are
based on insufficiency (rather than weight) of evidence, and represent a determination
by the court, correct or not, of some or all of the elements necessary to guilt. See Tibbs
v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). Further, the recent decision that a capital sentencing
trial is not a successive prosecution for double jeopardy purposes would not appear ap-
plicable to Fretwell's situation. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994). In Fretwell's
case, the state's evidence entitling it to a death sentence would have been found legally
insufficient had Collins been cited. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 848 n.5 (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing).
In any event, as a practical matter, the likelihood that Arkansas would have chosen
Fretwell's case to take on both adverse double jeopardy precedent and the law forbid-
ding use of the "double counting" aggravating factor by attempting to appeal a life sen-
tence without parole must surely be seen as remote.
3' In the interim, the United States Supreme Court had decided Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), permitting use of aggravating factors that duplicate ele-
ments of the capital offense. This prompted, if not required, the Eighth Circuit to over-
rule Collins. The Eighth Circuit did so in Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
312 Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. at 845.
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assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial. Absent some effect of challenged conduct
on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee is generally not implicated." '313
Thus, when even Strickland was not sufficient to deny a right to counsel
claim, it was necessary for the majority to drive the issue completely into
the overall fundamental fairness arena, disregarding Gideon altogether. Hav-
ing done so, they simply pronounced the proceeding "neither unfair nor un-
reliable." '314
Whether deincorporation of the right to counsel is part of a general
move by the Court to return to fundamental fairness analysis on all constitu-
tional criminal law issues has not, and cannot, be firmly established by this
brief examination of a small number of opinions. If, as I believe, such a
move is underway, it is a highly significant development and certainly wor-
thy of further research. We should not belatedly discover one day that Jus-
tices Black, Frankfurter, and others were arguing over nothing. This Article,
however, establishes that the right to counsel has been deincorporated, and
that is a part of the destructive legacy of Strickland.
C. Undermining the Right in Practice
The sheer volume of cases demonstrating the practical harm of
Strickland's doctrine presents a formidable editing challenge.3"5 Capital
3.3 Id. at 842 (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 843. There was a strained effort to reinterpret Strickland and analogize to a
completely inapposite case about not having a right to have a lawyer assist perjury. Id.
at 842-44. The brief majority opinion, however, invests little effort in defense of its re-
markable result. The opinion's essence conveys only the simple message: We've got the
votes.
3 " For samples of the many shocking cases, see generally Vivian Berger, The Chiro-
practor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 245, 245-49 (1991) (describing the non-representation of Georgia capital
defendants Jack House and Billy Mitchell); Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unprepared Law-
yer Cited, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 14 (describing representation of black capital defen-
dant by 83 year old former imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan); Roger Parloff, Legal
Aid, Barely, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1993, at 26 (citing instances of denial of relief
under prejudice prong in cases where defense attorneys were asleep, or using heroin and
cocaine throughout the trial, or drunk during the trial).
The most stunning and persuasive examples of the kind of defense given those
whose lives are'at stake after Strickland is provided by Stephen B. Bright, Director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, and one of the finest capital defense attorneys
in the country. Stephen provides real representation to capital defendants in the deep.
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cases will be emphasized because the harm is most acute and the "hind-
sight" doctrine is the most flawed in such.cases. Case examples will concen-
trate on ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising in the United States
Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits because the
states in these jurisdictions are responsible for almost 80% of the executions
carried out in the last twenty years.316
Several matters are apparent from observation of Strickland in practice.
First, of course, is that many instances of dreadful lawyering are found to be
acceptable. These, and even the few cases where relief is granted by the
courts, illustrate that Strickland's heavy presumption of competence is high-
ly questionable. More disturbing, it will be seen, is that many of the cases
involve not simply negligence or worse in preparation and presentation of a
defense, but abandonment of clients by the one person on whom the law
and the profession rely, not to abandon the clients, but to advocate vigorous-
ly for them. 1
It is also interesting to note, though detailed examination is not possible
in this Article, that the injustices in Strickland's prejudice prong and in
Cronic's insistence that the record show specific instances of inadequate
performance are ironically but clearly made more apparent by the way both
requirements are circumvented when some courts conclude that petitioners
deseive relief. Seldom are the instances in which claimants prevail if their
claims are analyzed in straight Strickland terms. Instead, the courts that
grant relief claim that Cronic created an exception to the requirement that
prejudice from deficient performance be demonstrated. These courts con-
South. I confess to bias. Stephen is a friend, and I am a great admirer of both his trial
skills and his basic humanity. That admiration is shared, however, by many, including
the past president of the ABA. See Talbot D'Alemberte, The Heroism of Steve Bright,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 8.
For chilling examples of inadequate capital defense, including one case of a since
executed defendant whose defense passed Strickland muster even though defense coun-
sel later apologized to the client for having been under considerable stress during trial
because he was at the time on drugs and breaking up with both his wife and his gay
lover and was really not focused on the trial, see Bright, In Defense of Life, supra note
15, at 857-62; see also Bright, Death by Lottery, supra note 15, at 689-94; Death Pen-
alty Legislation and the Racial Justice Act, 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4618 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 519 (1990) (statement of Stephen B. Bright, Southern Prisoners'
Defense Committee).
316 By the third quarter of 1994, Texas, Florida, Virginia, Louisiana, Georgia, Ala-
bama, North Carolina, and South Carolina, in that rank, had carried out 78.25% of the
executions since 1972. Execution Breakdown by State, Death Row, U.S.A. (NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund) 697 (Fall 1994).
... Professional responsibility aspects of this type of ineffective assistance of counsel
are dealt with briefly in the sections that follow. See infra text accompanying notes
413-29.
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strue dicta in Cronic to provide that when there has been an actual break-
down of the adversarial process at trial, no showing of prejudice is re-
quired.3"' Of course, the distinction between Cronic's dicta and
Strickland's requirement that claimants show that defense counsel failed to
provide meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case sufficient to
justify confidence in the result, i.e., deficient performance that caused preju-
dice, is an extremely fine one at best. This distinction, however, may be one
of the only ways to address Justice Marshall's legitimate dissent in
Strickland that its test did not ensure that even persons against whom evi-
dence appears overwhelming are convicted only through fundamentally fair
procedures." 9
318 See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991). The court
granted relief because Swanson's appointed counsel, David Ochoa, repeatedly conceded
in his closing argument to the jury that there was no reasonable doubt that his client
was guilty of bank robbery. Id. at 1077-79. The panel majority found that Ochoa had
abandoned his client and joined the prosecution at a critical stage of the proceedings. Id.
at 1075. The government argued that Swanson had not shown prejudice under
Strickland. Id. at 1072. If Strickland applied, the government surely would have pre-
vailed. The government's case that Swanson was the robber included four eyewitnesses,
two photos from the bank surveillance camera, and defendant's fingerprints. Id. at 1079
(Wiggins, J., dissenting). Drawing on its own prior interpretation of Cronic dicta that
certain circumstances could obviate the need to show prejudice, the court wrote that
"Cronic presume[d] prejudice where there ha[d] been an actual breakdown in the ad-
versarial process at trial." Id. at 1072 (emphasis added) (quoting Toomey v. Bunnell,
898 F.2d 741, 744 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 960 (1990)).
Cronic, of course, involved a claim that an external factor, insufficient preparation
time, precluded effective assistance. See supra text accompanying notes 173-85. The
Court, however, did state that prejudice would be presumed "if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (emphasis added). Swanson found a crucial equiva-
lence between an actual adversarial breakdown of some component of a trial, caused by
inadequate performance of counsel, and complete failure to subject the prosecution's
case to adversarial testing. Unfortunately, a more likely characterization of the "Cronic
exception," if there is such an exception, can be found in Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d
1125 (11 th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the exception and its appli-
cability to attorney performance, but in denying relief emphasized that the exception
was quite narrow and the burden of establishing it quite heavy. Id. at 1152-53.
Less surprisingly, non-performance of defense counsel during all or part of a trial
has permitted some courts to put the right to counsel claim in the Gideon complete de-
nial pigeonhole and grant relief without a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Tucker v.
Day, 969 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1992) (counsel at resentencing hearing did nothing, observ-
ing that he was "just standing in for this one"); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831
(9th Cir. 1984) (counsel cross-examined and made appropriate objections during some
portion of trial, but slept through most of it).
9 See supra text accompanying note 152.
1995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
1. Abandonment of Client
Even to courts so inclined, innovation to avoid application of the
Strickland test is available only in limited circumstances. Strickland's great-
est practical harm may be the way both prongs of its test can be interpreted
to permit abandonment of clients, especially in capital cases. This abandon-
ment is often most apparent during opening statements and closing argu-
ments. The performance and prejudice requirements are evaluated taking
into account that arguments are not evidence and that jurors are instructed to
that effect. Thus, it is easier to find that what may charitably be described as
shortcomings in defense arguments are not prejudicial.32 Some abandon-
ments by argument even survive the Strickland performance prong because
the reviewing court views the argument as a tactical decision to maintain
credibility with jurors, not to insult their intelligence, or to adopt a "low
key" strategy.321
Examples of defense attorneys disassociating themselves from clients are
far too numerous. It is especially disturbing to find such disassociation in
capital cases in which relief is denied under Strickland and the indigent de-
fendant is subsequently executed. Whether vigorous advocacy Would have
brought a different result or not, and no matter how aggravated the crime, it
must be particularly painful to go to one's death having been alone and
friendless in the legal system.
A most dramatic example of abandonment is found in Clozza v.
320 See, e.g., Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
953 (1990). Despite defendant's continued protestation of innocence at the penalty trial,
Brown's counsel argued that his client was "still a human being with a soul despite the
blackness of the crime that this man has committed." Id. at 499 n.17. The court con-
cluded that the findings of the jury would have been the same regardless of what de-
fense argued. Id. at 500-01.
The impact of argument has undergone little empirical testing. A recent study, how-
ever, indicates that improper prosecution argument in capital cases is influential. In
Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986), the
prosecutor's penalty phase argument was condemned as a litany of unprofessional and
unconstitutional remarks. Id. at 1408-14. The court, however, found the error harmless.
Id. at 1416. Researchers submitted a summation of the evidence, and the prosecutor's
closing argument to two groups of death-qualified mock jurors. Judith Platania et al.,
Prosecution Misconduct During the Penalty Phase of Capital Trials: Harmless Error?,
THE CHAMPION, July 1994, at 19. One group heard the trial argument, the other heard
the trial argument minus the objectionable portions. Id. at 20. A significantly higher
number of jurors who heard the improper argument voted for death. Id. at 21.
32 "[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have ... made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690 (1984).
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Murray.32 2 Albert Clozza, convicted and sentenced to death for the rape
and murder of a thirteen year old girl, claimed that Public Defender Peter
Legler had abandoned his duty of loyalty.323 In particular, the record
showed that defense counsel during the opening statement had told the jury
that it had been very difficult to get to like Clozza enough to represent him,
that he did not know what his defense would be, and that if the victim had
been his son, who was in law school, he would want to kill Clozza also.324
His closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial referred to an earlier
suicide attempt by Clozza and opined that "it would not have been the
greatest tragedy" had the attempt succeeded.325 The court found this per-
formance acceptable as part of a strategy to maintain credibility with the
jury in hopes of advancing an intoxication defense, in spite of Clozza's
testimony that he was sober, and in hopes of undermining Clozza's confes-
sion of rape.326
While it is possible that the court's characterization of Legler's remarks
as tactical is accurate, other portions of the trial record strongly suggest that
the tactic was not to maintain credibility with jurors but rather to identify
with the jurors at Clozza's expense. Legler made sure the jurors knew that
he did not want to defend his client and was present in court only because
he was required to be.327 During voir dire, for example, he directly re-
vealed his antipathy toward his client and his desire not to participate in the
trial. 2 He re-emphasized these points in his opening statement,329 and
during direct examination of Clozza.33°
322 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 913 (1991).
323 Id. at 1098.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 1099.
327 Id. at 1098 (quoting counsel's closing argument that he did not want to put his
client "back on the street").
328 "1 can assure you that I am not interested in participating. It is my duty. I am
about to, in this case, earn any income I may have had for the past ten years that I
haven't earned already." Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, Clozza v. Murray,
913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4009) (quoting Trial Transcript at 38, Common-
wealth v. Clozza (Va. Cir. Ct. Va. Beach)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 913 (1991).
329 Legler stated in his opening statement:
Quite frankly, I hope that the rest of the people that get involved in this type of
offense can retain counsel. I hope that all have sufficient funds to retain counsel
so my office does not become involved.
•.. I'm not going to stand here and tell you that I have learned to love this
kid because I haven't. I have told Albert that. I have been telling him, Albert, one
of the hardest things for me to do is going to be getting to like you enough so
that I can do an adequate job representing you.
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Trial Transcript at 542-43).
330 While conducting the direct examination of Clozza, Legler asked this series of
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Albert Clozza was executed in 1991."' More recently, citing Clozza,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim of another prisoner, since executed,
who alleged that his attorney had conceded in argument that death was the
appropriate sentence.332
Strickland's generous deference to "tactical" decisions has also spawned
approval of Clozza-type strategy in the Eleventh Circuit. In Devier v.
Zant,3 33 another captial case, the court approved of what it determined to
be a strategic decision to adopt a "low key" approach in order to maintain
credibility with the jury. The case was a retrial, and counsel determined that
a "confrontational" approach had not been successful.34 Part of this ap-
proved strategy involved refraining from objections during the prosecutor's
guilt phase argument, which included dropping heavy rocks and an invoca-
tion to "agree with me" that defendant was guilty.35 As part of this strate-
gy, a tactical decision was also made not to object to the prosecutor's penal-
ty phase argument that included: comparing jurors to soldiers with an un-
pleasant duty to perform-returning a death verdict-and arguing that fail-
ure to do their duty would result in loss of their birthright; arguing that
Devier was like a cancer who should be exorcised to protect society; and
claiming that life in prison would be a pleasant retirement for Devier.336
questions:
Q .... Did you think that the good Lord sent some guardian angel down
there and swept her up and clothed her and preserved her from the cold and
stopped her wounds from bleeding and healed her mouth and said everything is
fine and took her back home with her mom and dad, where she belonged?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you believe in that kind of a miracle?
A. I don't know.
Q. It is going to take one like that for me to save you. Do you know that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q: It is really weird celebrating Halloween representing you.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what it is like to walk out with your own kids and see peo-
ple dressed up as spooks and ghouls and think about you?
A. No, sir, I don't.
Q. It kind of takes the grins out of Halloween, Albeit. And these photographs
are going to take the grins out of their lives. I can tell you that. I would show
them to you, but I've probably done enough that I shouldn't do on this record.
Id. at 13 (quoting Trial Transcript at 1213-14).
... Execution Update, supra note 44, at 694.
332 Watkins v. Murray, 998 F.2d 1011 (table), No. 92-4010, 1993 WL 243692 (4th
Cir. July 7, 1993) (per curiam). Johnny Watkins was executed in 1994. Execution Up-
date, supra note 44, at 696.
333 3 F.3d 1445 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
334 Id. at 1451.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 1453.
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The court found counsel's stated reason for failure to object to be reason-
able: defense counsel believed that the trial judge would not control the
prosecutor.337
Clozza and Devier, considered with an earlier Eleventh Circuit case,
Messer v. Kemp,338 raise the disturbing possibility that the more aggravated
the crime alleged, the more judicially forgivable it is for defense counsel to
disassociate themselves, not just from the crime, but from their clients. Like
Albert Clozza and Darrell Devier, James Messer was accused of rape and
murder of a child.339 Though there was a considerable amount of evidence
against him, he entered a plea of not guilty and never authorized his attor-
ney, John Sawhill, to admit guilt.34° Just as in Clozza and Devier, the court
approved of Sawhill's strategic decision to abandon the client in order to
maintain credibility:
I would be no less honest with each and every one of you if
I tried to tell you the evidence said something other than
what [the prosecutor] indicates occurred on that day so I'm
not going to .... I'm a parent too and I can't explain or give
you some easy explanation for why so I won't try.
... I pray to God that none of you or myself.., will
ever see anything like this again.34" '
Shortly after Strickland, the Fifth Circuit also recognized the "maintain
credibility" strategy. In Mattheson v. King,342 the defense theory was that a
killing during a robbery was accidental rather than intentional. Only inten-
tional killing carried the possibility of a death sentence under the law appli-
cable at that time.343 During jury selection, Mattheson's counsel told the
jury that he was appointed, referred to Mattheson as a murderer, and "de-
scribed the crime as 'gross' and 'heinous.""'i" The court accepted the ex-
... Id. at 1454. Strickland, of course, did not directly address the question of whether
it is reasonable professional judgment to forgo meritorious objections because of a be-
lief that the trial judge will erroneously refuse to sustain them.
338 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986).
39 Id. at 1082.
340 Id. at 1084.
141 Id. at 1089 n.5. James Messer was executed July 28, 1988. Execution Update,
supra note 44, at 693.
342 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986).
143 See id. at 1434.
3" Id. at 1440. With respect to defense counsel's description of the crime, it should
be noted that the victim was killed by a single shotgun blast. See id. at 1434. The pros-
ecutor made much of the effect of the shot, arguing for a death sentence in part because
the victim's head had been blown off and was "in the ceiling." Id. at 1445. Though not
mentioned in Mattheson, the Supreme Court, five years earlier in another single shotgun
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planation of defense counsel that he had decided to be as candid as possible
with the jury, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, "presumably," said
the court, "to build up his credibility and that of his theory of the case. 3 45
No mitigating evidence was offered at the penalty trial, and no investi-
gation was conducted into Mattheson's mental history or mental state at the
time of the offense or at trial.346 Approving this conduct as a strategic de-
cision, the court relied on Strickland's admonition that when a client has
given counsel reason to believe that investigation would be fruitless or
harmful, the failure to investigate may not be challenged.347
Rarely do the right to counsel claims of death sentenced prisoners that
counsel have abandoned them succeed in the important Fourth, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Such claims fare somewhat better in the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits.348
blast case, had held that the use of a particular weapon and the gruesome state of the
crime scene could not be used to establish the "vileness" aggravating factor on which to
base a death sentence. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980).
341 Mattheson, 751 F.2d at 1440.
346 Id. at 1439-41.
341 Id. at 1440. In another Fifth Circuit case, Strickland was employed to permit
abandonment of the client, at the client's request. Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir.), reh 'g denied, 820 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987). Wayne
Felde, suffering from Vietnam Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, killed a Louisiana po-
liceman after escaping from custody following a manslaughter conviction in Maryland.
Id. at 281-82. Felde and his counsel agreed that if they were not successful in an insani-
ty defense, they would seek the death penalty. Id. at 283. They both argued for the
death penalty, defense counsel apparently honoring Felde's stated wish to die rather
than spend his life in prison. Id. at 284-85. The court sidestepped the performance
prong argument that it is utterly inappropriate for an attorney actively to advocate for
his client's death. Instead, the court denied relief using the prejudice prong conclusion
that there was no reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different
without defense counsel's complicity. Id. at 284. Wayne Felde was executed March 15,
1988. Execution Update, supra note 44, at 693.
348 See, e.g., Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988). Kevin Osborn's
attorney, Leonard Munker, made public statements that his client was playing a game to
attract attention, and that he was not amenable to rehabilitation. Id. at 628-29. At the
sentencing phase of the trial, he stressed the brutality of the crimes and analogized his
client and co-defendants to "sharks feeding in the ocean in a frenzy." Id. (quoting
Osborne v. Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610, 617 (D. Wyo. 1986)). Granting relief, the
court found that Munker had "abandoned the required duty of loyalty to his client, . ..
acted with reckless disregard for his client's best interest and, at times, apparently with
the intention to weaken his client's case." Id. at 629; see also Frazer v. United States,
18 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1994) (error to deny evidentiary hearing where client alleged
appointed counsel called him "stupid nigger son of a bitch" for insisting on trial, and
expressed hope he would get life sentence in non-capital case.)
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2. Deficient Performance
When the defendant claims deficient performance rather than client
abandonment, the record appears only marginally better. Strickland's influ-
ence in permitting denial of claims where the court may be so inclined be-
cause of revulsion at the offense is readily apparent.
The Fourth Circuit granted relief in Hyman v. Aiken.349 Hyman's attor-
ney, Demetrious Stratos, had stopped subscribing to reporters and advance
sheets years before the trial, did not own a copy of the South Carolina death
penalty statute, and had not read any U.S. Supreme Court death penalty
opinions.350 Stratos and his co-counsel also failed to review the testimony
of key witnesses, including Hyman himself, or to review documents made
available to them by the prosecutor.35" ' Stratos later testified that "he could
not recall doing anything to prepare for the sentencing phase," and that he
had spoken with Hyman for maybe a half minute between the guilty verdict
and the penalty trial. 52 That the Fourth Circuit granted relief on both
prongs of Strickland53 could be encouraging, but for consideration of two
facts. First is the realization that this level of lawyering had been found
acceptable by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the lower federal court,
and the Fourth Circuit itself prior to remand by the Supreme Court on an-
other issue.354 Second is the fact that the Fourth Circuit has not granted
relief to a death sentenced prisoner on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in the seven years since Hyman.
A more typical and recent Fourth Circuit approach in capital cases may
be found in McDougall v. Dixon.355 Although the court found some of de-
fense attorney Jerome Paul's conduct to be "unethical, outrageous, and even
illegal," the court determined that Strickland's requirements for relief had
not been met.356 Paul's license to practice law had been suspended for a
second time prior to trial, but the court noted that the trial occurred before
the effective date of the suspension.357 The court also found that if Paul
suborned perjury from witnesses, such conduct surely was illegal, but no
prejudice had been shown from it.35 Perhaps most interestingly, the court
3" 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987).
350 Id. at 1412-13.
351 Id. at 1413-14.
352 Id.
133 Id. at 1416.
354 Id. at 1412.
355 921 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991).
3516 Id. at 533-39.
317 Id. at 534.
358 Id. at 535.
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found no breach of Strickland's performance prong in Paul's penalty phase
argument to a death-qualified jury.359 To this group of twelve, all of whom
had presumably affirmed their willingness to impose a death sentence in an
appropriate case, Paul argued that the death penalty was a tool of totalitari-
ans and fascists, and that believers in capital punishment love killing."
Other experienced attorneys, including Paul's co-counsel, thought the argu-
ment was stupid or worse.36' The trial judge, however, thought it was as
good or better than other death penalty arguments he had heard.362
Examination of the Eleventh Circuit's "performance" cases illuminates
the damaging effect of Strickland's suggestion that communications with
and observation of clients by untrained defense attorneys can render reason-
able their decisions to conduct little or no investigation, and to present no
evidence in mitigation. This influence was apparent in Bush v.
Singletary.363 In Bush, defense counsel admitted that he prepared no miti-
gating evidence at all to present at the penalty trial, and that he never
looked into Bush's psychological history.3" A majority of the Eleventh
Circuit panel, however, concluded that he had done enough.365 Muschott,
the defense counsel, discussed mitigation with the client and three members
of his family.366 Two indicated they did not want to testify, and "no other
family member came forward despite Muschott's willingness to talk with
them.""36 Similarly, Muschott testified that Bush "had no problems com-
municating and gave no indication that he was ever out of touch with reali-
ty. ''368 Even so, counsel discussed what he knew about his client with a
psychiatrist, Dr. Tingle, who said he could be of no help.369 The court con-
cluded that the decision not to investigate more thoroughly, or to have Bush
examined by a mental health professional, was within Strickland's wide
range of professional competence, "[g]iven what Muschott could readily ob-
serve about Bush, what Muschott knew of Bush's background, and the
advice of Dr. Tingle. 370
311 Id. at 536-39. In a capital case, the prosecution is permitted to strike for cause
any prospective jurors whose reservations about imposition of the death penalty would
prevent or substantially impair their ability to follow the law. Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.s. 810 (1985).
31 McDougall, 921 F.2d at 536.
361 Id. at 535.
362 Id. at 536.
363 988 F.2d 1082 (11 th. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 705 (1994).
364 Id. at 1094 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 1091-92.
366 Id. at 1091.
367 Id.
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Fortunately, the dissenting opinion revealed what defense counsel could
easily have found and presented.37" ' Readily available mitigation evidence
included psychological and mental health factors, as well as family history
and personal factors.372 An available prison report stated that Bush some-
times lost touch with reality, and suggested that he may have suffered from
severe emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, a statutory mitigat-
ing factor.373 Defense counsel, however, spoke with Dr. Tingle about miti-
gation for no more than ten minutes, and not at all with other court appoint-
ed mental health professionals.374 Counsel did not request that Bush be ex-
amined.375 Finally, counsel did not show the doctors the prior report or re-
fer to it because he did not know of its existence.376
It must nevertheless be acknowledged that, unlike the Fourth Circuit,
capital petitioners in the Eleventh Circuit do sometimes prevail on claims
similar to those that failed in Bush.377 Apart from changes in court and
panel membership, a major part of this apparent inconsistency may be attrib-
utable to Strickland's refusal to acknowledge that there are specific, very
basic, identifiable actions that must be taken in every case in order to render
reasonably effective assistance. In capital cases, with due deference to tacti-
cal decisions, those requirements include a mitigation investigation that at
least extends to collecting every available document on which the client's
name appears-medical records, school records, prison records, military
records, etc.-before making any tactical decisions about the penalty tri-
al.3
78
In the Fifth Circuit, the court has granted relief in a non-capital case on
facts similar to those of Bush.379 Likewise, in a capital case where
37' Id. at 1093 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
M7 Id. at 1094 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
373 Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
3- Id. at 1095 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
375 Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
371 Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
377 See, e.g., Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1992) (lack of preparation
for sentencing phase of trial resulted in prejudice to defendant and required
resentencing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477 (11 th Cir. 1991) (counsel was inef-
fective because of no reasonable investigation of mitigating evidence at sentencing
phase), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2282, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992);
Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (holding that insufficient investiga-
tion failed to uncover wealth of mitigating evidence and resulted in ineffective assis-
tance and prejudiced defendant).
37 1 also argue that reasonably effective assistance cannot be given unless some evi-
dence is presented in mitigation at the penalty trial, with one narrow exception. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 448-56.
3' See, e.g., Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1987) (relief granted where
counsel in aggravated rape case failed to secure records or make other inquiries at men-
tal institution from which client escaped, relying instead on report of court appointed
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counsel's failure to present any evidence at penalty trial was patently unrea-
sonable on the face of the record, the court has granted relief under the
Strickland standard. In Jones v. Thigpen,3"' no mitigation evidence was
presented by counsel for a seventeen year old who was severely mentally
retarded (I.Q. 41), and was an accomplice to a robbery but was not proven
to have had any intent or role in the homicide.3"' Jones, like Hyman, was
determined on facts that would appear to call for a remedy under any legal
standard.
More recently, however, the Fifth Circuit has displayed extreme reluc-
tance to pronounce a defense attorney's performance deficient under
Strickland. In Kyles v. Whitley,382 the court declined to find deficient per-
formance even though counsel admitted that he failed to interview or call a
key witness because he mistakenly believed that state law would require him
to vouch for the credibility of the witness.383 Curtis Kyles was convicted
and sentenced to death for a murder during a robbery." His defense was
that Joseph "Beanie" Wallace committed the murder and framed him.8 5
There was circumstantial evidence supporting that line of defense.386 De-
fense counsel testified at the habeas hearing that he failed to interview and
call "Beanie" because of his misunderstanding of Louisiana law.387 The
majority, however, concluded that "[t]he Strickland analysis ... judges the
conduct of the defense [attorney] according to the objective standard of the
reasonable attorney. '388 The court thereupon provided what it considered
to be several legitimate tactical reasons for not calling "Beanie," reasons
that might have been, but were not, advanced by counsel.389 The court
then concluded that "[s]ince Beanie did not testify and we are not convinced
that he should have been called to testify, Regan's failure to interview Bean-
ie had no apparent bearing on the conduct of the trial."39
psychiatrist, filed the day before trial, that client was sane).
380 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1087 (1987).
381 Id. at 1103.
3M2 5 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1610 (1994).
383 Id. at 818-20.
314 Id. at 820.
385 Id. at 809.
386 Id. at 808-10, 813-16.
387 Id. at 819.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 818-19.
39o Id. at 819. Here is Strickland hindsight at its most curious. The attorney could
provide no reasonable explanation for his tactical decision, but the court, examining the
record, could. Another issue required that the majority analysis be even more convolut-
ed. Kyles claimed error under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because of the
state's failure to disclose contradictory statements taken from "Beanie." Kyles, 5 F.3d at
811; id. at 834-35 (King, J., dissenting). Thus, it was necessary to conclude that the
Brady violation was harmless. Id. at 818. That could be done since "Beanie" was not
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Finally, in summary fashion, the court rejected a claim based on failure
of counsel to interview the eyewitnesses against Kyles prior to trial.39' The
majority apparently found close enough for government work the fact that
counsel cross-examined three of the four witnesses during a pretrial suppres-
sion hearing.392
Another recent Fifth Circuit case again raised the disturbing possibility
that the aggravated facts of some capital cases result in review of defense
attorney performance that is far more charitable than the rule of law should
allow, however understandable a visceral human disinclination to grant relief
of any kind might be. In King v. Puckett,393 the victim was an eighty-four
year old widow who had been struck on the head, strangled, and drowned in
her bathtub.394 King was tried and sentenced to death.3 95 On appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, the court remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court
because of the invalid application of an aggravating factor.396 Recognizing,
however, that the state court was authorized to cure that error without af-
fording King a new sentencing hearing, the court reached the merits of his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.397
To the familiar allegation that he was ineffective for failing to investi-
gate and present readily available mitigating evidence, defense counsel as-
serted, without further explanation, that he had made a tactical decision.39
The lower courts, in similar conclusory fashion, had agreed.399 The Fifth
Circuit found that "the superficial investigation and decision not to offer
witnesses" was reasonable.'l As in Kyles, the court itself furnished some
of the tactical reasons."' One of them was quite remarkable. It was that
defense counsel knew that Porter, the man King accused of committing the
crime, was also King's uncle.f 2 Therefore, the court concluded, interview-
ing and calling him or other family members to testify would have caused
called, there were good reasons not to call him, and the withheld statements were useful
only to impeach his credibility. Id. at 818-19. A lengthy dissent illuminates these and
further deficiencies in the Strickland and Brady analyses by the majority. Id. at 820-44
(King, J., dissenting).
391Kyles, 5 F.3d at 820.
392 Id. at 819. The opinion was silent on whether counsel had done any investigation
that would inform the cross-examination.
193 1 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 1993).
39 Id. at 282. The victim in Kyles was a 60 year old woman shot to death as she
loaded groceries into her car. Kyles, 5 F.3d at 808.
391 King, 1 F.3d at 283.
39 Id. at 284.
39 Id. at 284-85.
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tension within the family. 40 3
Denying the second part of King's claim required resort to Strickland's
prejudice prong.4' Defense counsel, Joe Sams, Jr., had been assisted by a
recent law school graduate, Thomas Kesler. 5 When Kesler interviewed
King, he determined that King was "slow" and "dull-witted. ' '4°6 Conse-
quently, Sams sought a mental examination of King that, inter alia, specifi-
cally addressed his level of intelligence.4 7 In due course, Sams received
from the state hospital a one paragraph report that King was sane and com-
petent to stand trial.408 The court was disturbed that Sams simply dropped
the matter at this point.40 9 The court could not come up with a tactical rea-
son for failure to pursue a matter counsel himself had identified as potential-
ly mitigating.4 10 The court, however, concluded that it was not necessary
to decide whether this failure was professionally unreasonable under
Strickland, because King had not shown prejudice.4t'
Having thus been forced to stretch Strickland close to the limit in order
to protect counsel whose death sentenced client protested his innocence,
who conducted at best a superficial investigation, and who presented no evi-
dence at either phase of the trial, the court appealed to the Mississippi Su-
preme Court for help: "While acknowledging that we are without authority
to order a new sentencing hearing, we recommend that the holding of such a
proceeding be given serious consideration in this case, given the failure of
King's counsel to pursue potentially mitigating evidence.4
'12
The legal and practical effect of the court's action in King was this
message from a federal to a state court: in spite of a constitutional error in
the basis for this man's death sentence, and in spite of the deficient perfor-
mance of his attorney, you are free to execute him without further proceed-
ing. We hope you will not.
At best, Strickland in practice is no better than Betts, failing to provide
reviewing courts with even a semblance of a bright line to minimize incon-
sistent application. At its worst, Strickland permits the worst lawyering to
pass muster, especially in the "worst" cases. Doctrinally and practically,
Strickland is Betts and should suffer a similar fate. Whether or not that hap-
43 Id.
4 Id. at 285.




4o9 Id. at 284.
410 Id. at 284-85.
411 Id. at 285. The court also found no error in the denial of an evidentiary hearing
on these claims. Id.
412 Id. at 287.
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pens, the legal profession, having been drafted by Strickland into the role of
accomplice to injustice, should respond.
III. REVIVING THE RIGHT
A. Response from the Organized Profession
As noted, Strickland erroneously referred to a sufficient link between the
standards of the legal profession and the Sixth Amendment to justify the
heavy presumption of adequacy that the Court read into the Amend-
ment.4' 3 The Court further involved the profession by decreeing that the
proper measure of performance was to be "reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms."'414 Even before adding the infamous prejudice prong,
however, the Court undermined the logic of its pronouncement by designat-
ing the norms of the profession as no more than guidelines to reasonable-
ness.41 One would assume that the performance norms of the profession
would be recognized as at least relevant to the Sixth Amendment inquiry.
The language of Strickland does not appear to make them any more than
that. Further, in aid of its apparent purpose to fashion a permissive constitu-
tional standard, the Court's reference to professional norms was only to
aspirational norms, such as the sections of the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice dealing with the defense function.4"6 Surely the norms of the pro-
fession are also reflected in its disciplinary standards, many of which are
implicated in the issue of effective assistance of counsel. The disciplinary
standards should not have been ignored.
The highest court in the land has thus involved the organized bar in the
fashioning of a constitutional standard that is damaging to respected doc-
trine, unworkable, and unjust. It is incumbent upon the profession to make
this matter a priority and to fashion an appropriate response. Thus far, there
is little evidence that it has done so.
1. Incompetence is Unethical
The organized profession's most influential voice is the American Bar
Association. The conduct of virtually every attorney in the nation is ostensi-
bly governed by a state-adopted version of the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Code), the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
413 See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
414 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added).
415 Id.
416 Id.; see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 171, §§ 4-1.1 to -8.6.
Strickland refered to the 1980 edition, which does not differ significantly from the 1993
edition.
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(Rules), or a combination of the two. These "professional norms" contain
provisions that cover, or should cover, some of the more egregious forms of
ineffective assistance of counsel. If the profession enforced these norms, it
is not inconceivable that Strickland would at least be modified to include re-
moval of the requirement to show prejudice in cases in which a disciplinary
rule had been violated. Sadly, there is little indication that the organized
legal profession is concerned with this issue, or indeed with criminal law in
general. While the existence of unreported disciplinary action is certainly a
possibility, a computer search indicates no reported case of an attorney be-
ing disciplined for failures related to criminal defense.417
This neglect is disturbing, given the applicability of many disciplinary
norms to the defense function. The Code, for example, forbids attorneys to
handle legal matters they know, or should know, they are not competent to
handle, unless competent counsel is associated. 18
A related provision of the Rules is particularly instructive on the ques-
tion of accepting appointments to defend those charged with capital murder.
Rule 6.2 is written in affirmative language designed to encourage pro bono
service in such cases. It contains a general prohibition against avoiding ap-
pointed cases, but permits attorneys to decline appointment in three situa-
tions, identified as "good cause":
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribu-
nal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law;
(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unrea-
sonable financial burden on the lawyer; or
(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer
as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the
lawyer's ability to represent the client."9
Two of these "good cause" situations are particularly relevant to appointed
capital defense counsel. First, representing the client well is virtually certain
4 ' There are indications, however, that attorneys appointed in capital cases run afoul
of the profession's rules in matters other than capital defense. At one time, a quarter of
death row inmates in Kentucky had been represented at trial by attorneys who were lat-
er disbarred or resigned after being charged with professional responsibility violations.
Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Ben-
efit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 59, 74 n.92 (1989).
411 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1983). The provision
also forbids neglect of a case and inadequate preparation. Id. The Rules counterpart
contains the affirmative commands that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1993).
419 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1993).
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to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer.42 Second, as
demonstrated in the "abandonment" cases discussed above,42' in many in-
stances, the client or the cause is likely to be so repugnant to the lawyer as
to adversely affect the adequacy of defense. Even if it is unrealistic to ex-
pect that Rule 6.2 will ever be translated into a practical disciplinary tool,
the integrity of the profession will be far better served if attorneys would
pause and give thought to its caveats before accepting appointment in capital
cases.
422
Official commentary to Rule 6.2 also acknowledges an important link to
another disciplinary standard. The commentary accurately refers to the "re-
pugnant client or cause" exception as a conflict of interest. 423 This link is
important and is often overlooked. Although there are disciplinary Rules and
Code sections prescribing a duty of loyalty and avoidance of conflicts,
424
these sections are generally addressed by the profession as if they were rele-
vant only to multiple client representation or direct financial conflicts.425
Once the concept of conflict of interest is viewed as encompassing the is-
sues addressed in Rule 6.2, however, a greater truth may be seen. In capital
cases, where appointed counsel are often sole practitioners or members of
small firms in rural areas, counsel's conflicting interests may include an in-
terest in not alienating potentially fee-paying clients, trial judges, or prosecu-
tors.
420 Citing factors present in several of the most active death penalty states, including
fee limits and absence of any indigent defense system, Steven Bright advised Congress
that an attorney doing a competent job of capital defense in those states, overhead con-
sidered, can expect to lose $20-50 per hour. Death Penalty Legislation and the Racial
Justice Act, 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4618 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 536 (1990)
(statement of Stephen B. Bright, Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee).
The situation has become, if anything, worse since Bright's testimony, as demon-
strated in authorities cited by Justice Blackmun in a recent opinion. See McFarland v.
Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
421 See supra text accompanying notes 320-48.
422 There is no counterpart to Rule 6.2 in the disciplinary sections of the Code. Simi-
lar admonitions, however, are found in Ethical Considerations 2-29 and 2-30. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29, -30 (1983).
423 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 cmt. (1993).
424 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1993); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 (1983).
425 Commentary to Rule 1.7 reflects this focus. Rule 1.7's comment does not contain
a cross-reference to Rule 6.2, but advises that "a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advo-
cate against a [client] the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if [the other
matter] is wholly unrelated." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt.
[3] (1993). The comment also advises that "[a] lawyer may not allow related business
interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in
which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest." Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. [6].
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All of the various Code and Rules provisions implicate the first and
great commandment of the profession: the Code's Canon 7 commands that
attorneys shall represent their clients zealously within the bounds of the
law. 426 Regrettably, indeed inexplicably, there is no direct counterpart in
the Rules. The preamble to the Rules, however, designates zealous advocacy
as part of a lawyer's professional responsibility. 47 Similar language is
found in the commentary to Rule 1.3.42 In addition to the admonition to
engage in zealous advocacy, however, the commentary also contains a limi-
tation that reveals the Rules were not written with criminal law in mind:
"However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be
realized for [the] client. '429 In many facets of civil litigation this limiting
language would be entirely appropriate. So long as the government is seek-
ing through the legal system to kill one's client, however, any intentional
failure by an attorney to press for every advantage that might be realized for
the client within that system should be viewed as unprofessional.
The organized legal profession has not re-examined the applicability of
its disciplinary norms, nor considered enforcement efforts, in response to the
ineffective assistance of counsel problem. Rather, the profession has done
little more than promulgate guidelines that urge lawyers to do better. This is
no more of a role for the profession than that envisioned by Strickland when
it co-opted professional norms to help justify its regrettable constitutional
standard. Even if the constitutional standard were meaningful, it would be
inexcusable for the profession to operate as if its fundamental disciplinary
tenets had no application to criminal defense. To continue to operate that
way for a decade after Strickland's demonstrated inadequacy is collectively
unethical. The issue deserves to be made a priority by officers of the orga-
nized bar in every jurisdiction, and by the appropriate committees of the
ABA.
2. Refashioning a Minimal Constitutional Standard
In addition to addressing incompetent criminal defense as a professional
responsibility matter, the organized bar could make a great contribution by
helping to fashion a realistic constitutional standard. Much of what has been
proposed as an alternative to Strickland has, in fact, asked too much. Any
426 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
427 "As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1993).
428 The commentary provides: "A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. [1] (1993). The Rule itself only com-
mands "reasonable diligence and promptness." Id. Rule 1.3.
429 Id.
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constitutional standard is, after all, a bedrock minimum. Much of what
Strickland said about allowing defense attorneys some leeway to make tacti-
cal decisions, and to be wrong in those decisions, is valid. The Strickland
standard is a farce, but its replacement should be realistic. With the help of
competent practitioners, the organized profession could put an alternative to
Strickland on the table for consideration by the courts or legislatures.
Years before Strickland, David Bazelon, the highly respected Chief
Judge of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Circuit
identified and discussed many of the doctrinal and practical difficulties that
would result from adoption of a Strickland model. He 'attempted to establish
for the circuit an analytical framework far superior to that which would later
come down from the high court. His majority opinion for the panel in Unit-
ed States v. DeCoster430 noted the impact on ineffective assistance claims
of the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 3' The decision also held that if defen-
dants established a violation of what would later become the performance
prong of Strickland, the burden would then shift to the government to estab-
lish a lack of prejudice.432 The District of Columbia Circuit Court, sitting
en banc, rejected Judge Bazelon's position in a lengthy opinion.433 In the
interim, Judge Bazelon elaborated his doctrinal positions on the poor state of
criminal defense and on the attitude of trial judges in an article in the
Georgetown Law Journal.4 34
While the folly of rejecting Judge Bazelon's position on incorporation
and burden of proof of prejudice has been amply demonstrated by a decade
under Strickland, and, it is hoped, illustrated by this Article, Judge Bazelon
and others failed to deal adequately with another pillar upon which
Strickland rests. In his DeCoster opinions and Georgetown article, Judge
Bazelon purported to identify and detail the objective standards by which
430 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter DeCoster 1].
411 Id. at 1202. (addition of Sixth Amendment source of right to effective assistance
of counsel to due process source means "more stringent requirements" and entitles de-
fendant to "the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent
conscientious advocate").
432 Id. at 1204. Judge MacKinnon dissented from this proposition. He was concerned
that evidence of non-prejudice might be in the hands of defendants who could lawfully
keep it from the government. Id. at 1205 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The concern, if
not misplaced, is also a further illustration of the importance of the location of the bur-
den of proof in this context.
... United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter DeCoster
III]. The case covers 150 pages in the federal reporter, including a 36 page dissenting
opinion by Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Skelly Wright. Id. at 264-300 (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
434 David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811
(1976).
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defense attorney performance could be evaluated when determining the
Sixth Amendment issue.435 Judge Bazelon's approach was specifically re-
jected in Strickland's pronouncement that "[n]o particular set of detailed
rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant."436
Judge Bazelon had essentially adopted the ABA Standards for the De-
fense Function as the constitutional benchmark, while conceding that the du-
ties outlined in those standards were to be only a starting point for case by
case development of clearer guidelines.437 While this approach can occa-
sionally be found, even today,43 it is inadequate in two related respects.
First, the ABA Standards were and are largely aspirational or adviso-
ry-they are replete with "shoulds." '439 As unjust as Strickland has been, it
must be remembered that it deals with a bare constitutional minimum. How-
ever desirable better-than-minimal effectiveness may be, it is inappropriate
to adopt advisory standards as constitutional commands. Second, the ABA
Standards are necessarily vague and insufficiently detailed to define mini-
mally acceptable performance in the constitutional sense because they are
advisory. To be sure, Strickland's statement that no set of rules can account
for every circumstance or tactical situation faced by counsel is beside the
point. Conceding the truth of the Court's assertion, the question remains
whether minimally acceptable performance requirements can be identified
and communicated with some degree of clarity. I believe that task is not
insurmountable.
That is not to say that the task is not difficult. Consciously or not, Judge
Bazelon identified the dilemma. At one point, referring to replacement of
the "farce and mockery" test with requirements that counsel provide "rea-
sonably effective assistance" or exercise "customary skill and knowledge,"
he observed that this development was less than meets the eye-that the
new tests were themselves empty vessels into which content must be
poured."4 Judge Bazelon claimed that the DeCoster panel opinion had tak-
411 Id. at 823-24.
436 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
417 DeCoster 111, 624 F.2d at 304-06 (order of Judge Bazelon granting relief after re-
mand of DeCoster II included as appendix).
43 See, e.g., Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1254 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (de-
scribing the ABA standards as "[a]n objective standard of attorney performance, under
prevailing professional norms at the time of this case").
419 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 171, § 4-3.6. ("Defense
counsel should inform the accused of his or her rights at the earliest opportunity and
take all necessary action to vindicate such rights. Defense counsel should consider all
procedural steps . . ").
"0 Bazelon, supra note 434, at 820 (citations omitted).
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en the test to a "third plateau" by enunciating prophylactic rules."' Those
rules, as previously noted however, are scarcely clearer than requirements
that counsel act "reasonably."" 2
Acknowledging that Judge Bazelon did not solve every problem associ-
ated with this issue does not diminish his contribution or the prophetic force
of his wisdom. There would be a lot more justice in the criminal justice sys-
tem if the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court had accepted his DeCoster
approach. It is the profession's responsibility, however, to address further
the assertion of Strickland that performance can only be measured by a
standard as vague as "reasonably effective assistance."
Martin C. Calhoun is less well known than Judge Bazelon. Certainly
that was true in 1988, when he was an Executive Editor of the Georgetown
Law Journal. In an excellent note, Mr. Calhoun sought to refine and build
upon Judge Bazelon's checklist approach to determining reasonably effec-
tive performance by defense counsel."3 Calhoun modified the trial level
ABA Standards for the Defense Function by considering what he termed
"other authorities -and. . ., common sense.""4  Although neither he nor
Judge Bazelon articulated the problems inherent in fashioning objective
performance requirements in precisely the way that I have, Calhoun's effort
makes a real contribution and deserves more attention than that usually
accorded student notes." 5 Comparative references to Calhoun's checklist
are included in my own proposal which follows.
I confine my proposed checklist to the trial level in capital cases. The
checklist is offered as a contribution to dialogue rather than a definitive so-
lution to the problem. The checklist differs most from Bazelon's approach in
its omission of many basic components of good lawyering because they
could arguably involve tactical decisions. The checklist attempts to establish
with clarity some very minimum requirements so that some of the egregious
performance that has been permitted under Strickland will be more difficult
to condone. Because of bad lawyering, which for the sake of clarity is not
addressed in the checklist, and because courts sometimes have granted relief
44' Id. at 823.
442 In fairness, it must be noted that Judge Bazelon recognized that it is virtually im-
possible to fashion terminology for performance standards from which judges disin-
clined to grant relief could not escape. Id. at 827-28. He believed adoption of the ABA
Standards would make such judges more uncomfortable, but the thrust of his article was
an affirmative plea to judges to make the Sixth Amendment guarantee meaningful,
along with administrative guidance on how to do so with minimal disruption of the
docket. Id. at 821-23, 830-35.
43 Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413
(1988).
4" Id. at 438 n.157.
"5 For Calhoun's complete 11 point checklist, see id. at 438-40.
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by evaluating the entire trial context under the Strickland standard, failure to
render "reasonably effective assistance" under all the circumstances should
be retained as a residual basis for granting relief. In addition, this residual
standard should require that a finding that defense counsel has violated a
disciplinary norm of the legal profession is a per se finding of failure to
render reasonably effective assistance. Also, as I and many others have
argued, it is critical that any consideration of prejudice resulting from unsat-
isfactory performance be addressed under the Chapman harmless error test.
Furthering that essential reform should be easier if the requirements of the
performance prong are truly minimal and are stated as clearly and objective-
ly as possible.
Use of one imprecise term remains necessary in performance evalua-
tions. A court's determination that a violation of minimal checklist duties, or
overall reasonableness, is "substantial" should shift the burden of proving
absence of prejudice to the government." 6 At the trial level in a capital
case, very few violations of the duties described in the following list should
be required to trigger the finding required to bring about this shift.
MINIMAL DUTIES OF CAPITAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
(1) To read and become familiar with every capital opin-
ion by the Supreme Court, the appropriate federal
circuit court, and appropriate state courts since 1972.
(2) To collect every document relevant to the life of the
client, and to the offense with which he is charged.
For example: medical records, school records, social
service reports, military records, prison records.
(3) To ensure that the following persons are inter-
viewed: 47
a. The client." 8
This was Judge Bazelon's position, except that he would require proof that the
violation of defense counsel duties was substantial and unjustified. Bazelon, supra note
434, at 824-25. I have endeavored to make my list of duties so basic that there can be
no justification for violations.
47 Defining investigative duties so as to define minimum requirements is the most
difficult aspect of fashioning a performance checklist. Calhoun suggested: "[D]efense
counsel must promptly investigate the circumstances of the case by pursuing all avenues
that might lead either to facts or witnesses that could affect the merits of the case or the
potential severity of the sentence." Calhoun, supra note 443, at 438.
The remainder of the requirement went on to provide more specific guidance for
investigation of various lines of defense. Id. Calhoun's general language was substan-
tially equivalent to the command of the current ABA standard. See STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 171, § 4-4.1. With some trepidation, I have undertaken
to further particularize the investigative duty in capital cases.
448 Calhoun's list required that all relevant facts known to defendant be determined
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b. All members of the client's family, employ-
ers, teachers, friends, and all private or gov-
ernment personnel who have or at one time
had a legally recognized obligation to the
client. For example: doctors, social workers,
public assistance officials, jail personnel.
c. All law enforcement officers involved in the
case.
d. If they consent, all prospective prosecution
witnesses, including family members of the
victim.
e. All prospective defense witnesses identified
by client and by investigative steps outlined
in this checklist.
(4) To secure every resource to which the client is enti-
tled, without reciprocal obligation, by rule, statute, or
constitution. 9
(5) To secure all information regarding the prosecution's
case and all exculpatory evidence to which the client
is entitled, without reciprocal obligation, by rule, stat-
ute, or constitution.450
(6) In every case that an investigation leads counsel to
and explanations of confidentiality be made. Calhoun, supra note 443, at 438. The ABA
standards attempt to provide further guidance in the nature of the proper attorney-client
relationship. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 171, §§ 4-3.2, 4-3.8.
Deferring to attorneys, at least in the constitutional sense, to advance the client's cause
by investigation through various approaches, I simply insist that the client, and the other
parties listed herein, be interviewed.
"' For example, the client is constitutionally entitled to expert assistance in various
fields upon a showing that particular expert assistance is a "basic tool[] of an adequate
defense" in the case. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Some statutory provisions
for resources in capital cases have reciprocal obligations, thus rendering failure to use
them a tactical choice in some cases. Typically, however, these statutes provide some
resources without triggering reciprocal provisions. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1
(Michie 1990) (indigent capital defendant entitled to assistance of mental- mitigation ex-
pert without reciprocal obligation until decision to have expert testify at trial).
450 Similar to the law applicable to securing resources, discovery rules usually have
reciprocal requirements, but require providing some information without triggering the
requirements. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; VA. RULE 3A: 11. There are also, howev-
er, statutory entitlements to information that do not contain reciprocal obligations. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-434.11 (Michie Supp. 1994) (most forensic reports also cov-
ered by Rule 3A: 11 available directly from labs without reciprocal obligation imposed
by the rule); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie Supp. 1994) (prosecution must
disclose unadjudicated acts of misconduct evidence to be used at penalty trial in capital
cases).
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conclude that the prosecution can prove some crimi-
nal offense, to seek to negotiate a non-capital dispo-
sition of the case.45'
(7) To refrain from entering on client's behalf a plea of
guilty to an offense for which death is a possible
penalty without formal or strong informal prior assur-
ances that death will not be the sentence.452
(8) To examine every prospective juror regarding attitude
toward imposition of the death penalty and, where
applicable, exposure to pretrial publicity; thereafter,
to challenge -for cause or peremptorily every prospec-
tive juror whose responses indicate to counsel that
the prospective juror would be substantially impaired
in considering the particular evidence to be offered in
mitigation on behalf of the client, or whose responses
disclose a bias toward imposition of the death penal-
ty. To direct further questions to all jurors who ex-
press reservations about imposition of the death pen-
alty, with a view toward ensuring that no such jurors
are excused for cause unless, under existing law, they
are truly unqualified to sit.
41' The minimal nature of this requirement is illustrated by comparison with a related
standard on Calhoun's list. Calhoun's standard would go on to require not only that
prosecution plea offers be promptly communicated to the client, but that counsel not
recommend a plea agreement before learning the relevant facts and law and providing
client a candid estimate of probable outcomes. Calhoun, supra note 443, at 439. While
I would hope that counsel who failed Calhoun's requirement would frequently be found
ineffective under the residual "reasonableness" standard, all I absolutely require is that
some effort be made. There can be no tactical excuse for not doing so.
452 The profession recognizes the importance of client autonomy, and ordinarily com-
mits final word on entry of a plea to the client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1993) (lawyer to abide by client decisions concerning ob-
jectives of representation); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8
(1983) (final decision to forego legally available objectives because of non-legal factors
is ultimately for client). A plea of guilty to a capital offense, however, waives virtually
all appellate issues and can be tantamount to suicide. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149 (1990); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668; DuBois v. Commonwealth, 435
S.E.2d 663 (Va. 1993), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1994); Chabrol v. Commonwealth,
427 S.E.2d 374 (Va. 1993). Capital cases require more emphasis on the thrust of EC 7-
11 (advising that attorney's responsibilities may vary according to intelligence and men-
tal condition of client), and EC 7-12 (providing that any mental or physical condition of
client that renders him incapable of making considered judgment on his own behalf
casts additional responsibilities on lawyer). For these reasons, I have included the mini-
mal required duty of counsel to not allow or encourage client merely to throw himself
on the mercy of the court.
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(9) To refrain at all times from distancing himself from
the client in the presence of others, or communicat-
ing in any manner to the judge or the jurors anything
less than complete commitment to the client's
cause.
453
(10) At the guilt or innocence phase of trial, to advance
by affirmative evidence, cross-examination, or other
challenge to the prosecution's evidence, some theory
of defense suggesting that the client is not guilty or
is guilty of a non-capital offense or offenses.
(11) Where the client is convicted of an offense punish-
able by death, to put on evidence and argument, not
solely argument, in support of an articulable theory
of mitigation developed from prior investigation.
These responsibilities are not insignificant, but they are certainly mini-
mal. Recognizing that a constitutional standard is being fashioned, and at-
tempting utmost deference to anything that could legitimately be termed a
tactical decision, has meant that these requirements leave room for much
poor performance. Except for a requirement to seek available resources and
information, for example, they do not address pretrial motions practice, or
timely objections and motions during trial that may be necessary to preserve
the rights of the client on appeal.454 For the same reasons, I do not require
an opening statement or a closing argument, though I cannot imagine a capi-
tal case in which competent counsel would waive them.455
Real attempts to fashion acceptable performance standards that make it
more difficult for courts to excuse ineffectiveness as tactical decision mak-
ing necessarily move us toward a bare constitutional minimum rather than
the promotion of the kind of defense that persons accused of a crime de-
serve. Nevertheless, it can be done. Strickland was wrong in asserting that it
cannot be done. Judge Bazelon offered a blueprint. I have identified one
further contribution to judge Bazelon's blueprint, and offered my own
checklist as applicable to capital cases. The organized profession should ad-
dress the issue and seek to formulate basic requirements that defer to every
legitimate concern but eliminate tolerance for the kind of ineffectiveness that
45 The "strategy" of distancing one's self from the client in order to establish a rela-
tionship with the jury in a capital case should be recognized as fraudulent. See supra
text accompanying notes 321-44.
4' But see Calhoun, supra note 443, at 439 (requiring that counsel make timely ob-
jections that further the defendant's interests both at trial and in the event of appeal).
4" But see id. (requiring that counsel make an opening statement and "a closing ar-
gument that does not hurt the defendant's case and points out any weaknesses in the
government's case").
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this Article has shown is permitted to flourish under Strickland. Returning
the prejudice inquiry to Chapman411 will do much to alleviate the "guilty
anyway" excuse for Sixth Amendment violations. Refashioning minimum
performance standards will alleviate the worst of the "tactical decision" ex-
cuses.
B. Response from Individual Members of the Profession
1. All Members: Report Unethical Incompetence
As is true of all professions, the legal profession includes a segment of
membership that does not make us proud. Certainly a minority, that segment
has for years included attorneys who seek out appointment in criminal cases
in order to pocket the meager fees awarded while doing little or no work in
return. Such attorneys do not represent clients, they simply aid in processing
them. Unfortunately, there are also judges interested more in processing than
in representation, who will appoint such attorneys even in capital cases. Yet,
even though incompetence is unethical, these attorneys are almost never dis-
ciplined for that incompetence. To be sure, many of their number are includ-
ed among those who run afoul of the profession's other rules. In his final
written opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun took note that capital defense attor-
neys in eight states were disbarred, suspended, or disciplined at rates 3 to 46
times greater than the general rates of discipline for attorneys.457
One reason attorneys are not disciplined for grossly incompetent perfor-
mance, especially in capital cases, may be the understandable reluctance of
all of us to recognize our own ethical obligation to bring the matter to the
bar's attention. That obligation is found in Model Rule 8.3,45' and in Dis-
ciplinary Rules 1-102 and 1-103. 45' The obligation can be distasteful. Giv-
436 See supra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
411 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2786 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel"
in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 433, 434 (1993); Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal
Defense, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 44).
458 "A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate
professional authority." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1993).
45 Disciplinary Rule 1-102 commands that attorneys not violate or circumvent disci-
plinary rules, or engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1983). Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)
provides: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon such violation." Id. DR 1-103(A). Thus, at least in extreme situations akin to
some discussed in this Article, lawyers violate Disciplinary Rules 1-102 and 1-103 by
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en the minimal protection offered to clients by the Strickland standard,
however, it is even more important that we as individual members of the
profession do our part to address the problem in every responsible and legit-
imate manner.
2. Competent Defense Counsel: Litigate Competence Prior to Trial; Consider
Non-Participation
Predominantly in capital cases, trial judges sometimes will refuse to ap-
point aggressive, competent counsel and instead appoint unqualified counsel.
Motives for such action are, of course, impossible to pinpoint: maybe be-
cause competent counsel are known generally by the judge to demand more
court resources and generally refuse to allow the client to be processed;
maybe because competent counsel in a particular case have vigorously and
skillfully represented their client, obtained appellate relief, and the case is
back for a new trial or a new sentencing hearing;' 0 maybe because some
indigent clients simply do not recognize when they are being poorly served.
However the question arises, there is a legal basis for pretrial litigation of
the competence of appointed counsel and it is far better to examine the qual-
ifications and performance of counsel at that point than retrospectively under
the Strickland reverse-harmless error standard.
In both United States v. Woods,46' and Monroe v. United States,462
indigent defendants raised pretrial objections to going forward with their ap-
pointed counsel and made specific allegations of what they perceived to be
inadequate representation. Given the choice by the trial judge of proceeding
with appointed counsel or representing himself, Woods chose the latter
course.463 Woods' conviction was reversed by the Fifth Circuit because the
trial court relied on the general competence of appointed counsel and denied
the request without conducting any inquiry into the merits of Woods' allega-
tions.4" In Monroe, the court stated that:
failure to report.
4' That was the situation faced by Stephen Bright, a most competent capital defense
attorney, see supra note 315, upon the retrial of Tony Amadeo for capital murder.
Bright and William Warner had obtained relief for Amadeo from the United States Su-
preme Court. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988). The trial court nevertheless denied,
without a hearing, Amadeo's request that Bright and Warner be appointed for the retrial
and appointed two other attorneys. Petition for Interlocutory Review to Georgia Su-
preme Court, Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1989) (No. 46844).
461 487 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1973).
462 389 A.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
-3 Woods, 487 F.2d at 1219.
' Id. The court also refused to construe Woods' election to represent himself under
the circumstances as a waiver of the right to counsel. Id.
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[A]llegations of the inability of counsel to render effective
assistance at trial due to lack of preparation rise to the level
of a claim of a Sixth Amendment deprivation. In that situa-
tion, it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine the
validity of the assertions and to take whatever course of
action is thereby mandated.465
An option, if not an obligation, of competent counsel, when extreme
instances of poor representation come to their attention prior to trial, is to
seek termination of such representation. There are attorneys experienced and
capable in this unique litigation who will provide advice and assistance on
how to proceed.466
Another more painful choice to be considered by competent attorneys is
non-participation. Arguably, one of the factors explaining the profession's
quiet tolerance of Strickland for a decade, compared to its resistance to
Betts, is that capable counsel have in effect subsidized injustice; that they
have given skillful and vigorous defense at great personal and financial cost
to themselves; that, faced with provision of inadequate resources with which
to mount a defense, they have done the best they could with what they
had.467 That is an honorable choice by competent attorneys, but it is not
the only choice.
In 1988, a trial judge in Kentucky sent an open letter to all members of
the Northern Kentucky bar, begging for a volunteer to represent a man
charged with capital murder. The letter concluded: "PLEASE HELP. DES-
PERATE.""46 No member of the bar was ethically obligated to answer the
465 Monroe, 389 A.2d at 820.
466 Two such attorneys are: Stephen Bright, Southern Center for Human Rights, 83
Poplar St., N.W., Atlanta, GA 30303, and Kevin McNally, P.O. Box 1243, Frankfort,
KY 40602.
46 In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Kennedy cast his vote with
the majority holding that death sentenced prisoners did not require the assistance of
counsel to realize the constitutional guarantee of meaningful access to the courts in
post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 10. Apparently, he did so in part because no death
sentenced prisoner in Virginia had been unable to secure volunteer representation. See
id. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The gross inadequacy of payment to attorneys for representing indigent defendants
and of the resources provided for defense is a well-documented and continuing scandal.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 457, at 489-94; Klein, supra note 259, at 364-75; Mark
Curriden, Indigent Defense in the South: Begging for Justice, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at
64; J. Michael McWilliams, The Erosion of Indigent Rights, A.B.A. J., Mar. 8, 1993, at
8.
468 Letter from Honorable Raymond E. Lape, Presiding Judge, First Division, Kenton
Circuit Court, Covington, Kentucky, to members of Northern Kentucky Bar (May 17,
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judge's call.469 In a recent murder case from California, counsel was found
ineffective even under the Strickland standard.47 Part of the evidence sup-
porting the defendant's claim was that appointed counsel had billed only
twelve and one half hours prior to trial.47' The Ninth Circuit, however,
found this evidence credibly rebutted by the trial attorney's testimony that
he had spent many more hours on the case but billed only twelve and a half
because, as other testimony also indicated, the county courts were very fru-
gal with funds for appointed counsel in capital cases.472
Competent or not, no attorney should have been placed in counsel's
position in the California case. Professor Klein has reported on several liti-
gation strategies undertaken by attorneys for indigent criminal defendants.
He concluded:
Court officials ... and judges have rarely concerned
themselves with the quality of counsel provided indigent
defendants. Absent some completely unforeseeable event, the
prognosis for any additional funding for defense services is
poor indeed-it is almost inconceivable that elected politi-
cians would call for or provide additional funding to repre-
sent indigents accused of crime....
Systematic litigation attacking the constitutionality of the
system for delivering defense services, however, offers hope
and promise.473
Perhaps. Perhaps, however, it is legitimate for competent counsel to consider
whether their laudable efforts are helping to mask injustice,474 and there-
1988) (on file with author).
" Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2) commands withdrawal from representation if an
attorney knows or it is obvious that continuing will result in violation of a disciplinary
rule. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 2-110(B)(2) (1983). Disci-
plinary Rule 6-101 forbids handling a matter that the attorney is not competent to han-
dle without associating competent counsel; or handling a matter without preparation ad-
equate in the circumstances. Id. DR 6-101. Surely a fair reading of the command to
withdraw would extend to forbidding representation when an attorney knows or it is
obvious that violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-101 will result because time and resources
permitting adequate preparation will not be forthcoming.
470 Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923
(1995).
471 Id. at 1317.
472 Id.
47' Klein, supra note 259, at 432.
414 In 1991, Michael Mello, a most capable and experienced capital defense attorney,
advised those contemplating reinstatement of the death penalty in New York-which in
fact came about in March 1995-to consider the issue. Michael Mello, Facing Death
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fore delay the day when "close enough for government work" will be reject-
ed by the courts and by the profession.
3. Academics: Campaign to Have Strickland Overruled
As Anthony Lewis demonstrated, the demise of Betts was hastened by
scholarly criticism exposing its injustice, illogic, and unworkability.475 In
Gideon, academics also assisted in the remarkable amicus brief on behalf of
twenty-three state attorneys general, calling for Betts to be overruled.476
All of those factors call equally today for Strickland to be eventually over-
ruled.
It may be true that academics are far less influential in these highly
politicized times, especially in criminal justice matters. Nevertheless, do we
as members of the organized profession, and as practitioners and former
practitioners, not have an obligation to call attention to a legal standard that
demeans our profession and permits citizens to face state imposed death
virtually alone and defenseless? In one sense, we have more organizational
avenues available than our predecessors did in 1962. There are ABA com-
mittees, AALS committees, bar task forces, etc. to deal with the issue if we
see fit to put the matter on our professional agenda.
If there is a single academic or practioner who will undertake to defend
the doctrine, logic, or practical consequences of ten years of Strickland, I
hope that person will be prompted to undertake a response to this Article
and the many others that condemn Strickland. At least the issue will be
responsibly joined. But if Strickland has no real defenders, why has it lived
this long? How much longer will it be allowed to continue?
IV. CONCLUSION
In the early 1970s, a man named Dannie Sallie was tried on a charge of
first degree murder in North Carolina. Allegedly, Sallie, a soldier at Ft.
(Pretty Much) Alone: Some Thoughts on the Counsel Crisis that Will Follow New
York's Restoration of Capital Punishment, Paper Presented at Conference, The Death
Penalty: Perspectives on the Past and Future in New York State, Albany Law School
(Apr. 5, 1991) (on file with author). Mello asked whether competent defense counsel
might, in fact, be "the mask of the executioner?":
[Y]ou should make no mistake: The particpation of good defense lawyers...
makes the system-legal and beyond-feel more comfortable about execu-
tions .... Like it or not, by particpating in this process we to some extent inevita-
bly become enablers, the Doctors Feelgood of the death penalty assembly line.
This is our expected role.
Id. at 5.
475 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 120, 137-38.
476 Id. at 144-48.
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Bragg, had used his combat boots to kick to death his girlfriend's three year
old daughter. Sallie was represented by a young attorney who nevertheless
had defended, as one of the original attorneys in the North Carolina public
defender system, a number of jury trials in felony cases and enjoyed a good
reputation for competency among members of the local bar. In fact, after his
public defender service, he was invited to join one of the more well known
and respected firms in Fayetteville as a litigator.
Sallie's attorney considered that he had done a more than effective job
by persuading the jury to return a guilty verdict of the lesser included of-
fense of second degree murder. His only real self-criticism was his inability
to prepare Sallie to testify in his own behalf in denying the offense without
coming across as a hothead who appeared fully capable of committing it.
But the attorney had made another serious mistake. Out of ignorance of a
part of the law, he failed to object to a warrantless entry of the trailer where
the victim was killed. The entry produced photographs that impeached
Sallie's trial testimony. Sallie eventually sought relief in the federal courts,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Sallie v. North Carolina77 the Fourth Circuit was troubled by de-
fense counsel's failure to object. The court also noted that it had upgraded
the "farce and mockery" standard to "whether defense counsel's representa-
tion was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases," 478 observing that this standard did not require flawless perfor-
mance. But the court denied relief. The court strained to come up with a
reason to validate the entry, a reason that never crossed the mind of the
attorney, and then observed:
Counsel did not testify in the post-conviction hearing and so
we do not know what he may have done to investigate the
validity of the search and why he raised no formal objection
to it and admission into evidence of its fruits. But even if
counsel did nothing, we are constrained to conclude that
Sallie suffered no prejudice thereby.479
If the legality of the entry and admissibility of the photographs had been
properly litigated prior to trial, quite possibly the trial court would not have
gone to the lengths that the Fourth Circuit went retrospectively to fashion an
"exigent circumstances" justification. The photographs might have been
suppressed. The jury might have believed Sallie's denial. In any event, the
77 587 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979).
478 Id. at 640.
419 Id. at 641.
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lawyer got lucky. The pre-Strickland deference to generally competent coun-
sel and what would later become the Strickland prejudice prong effectively
mooted the question of whether he had made a basic error for which there
was no tactical justification. The opinion did not mention the defense
attorney's name. You have probably guessed it by now.
